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NATIONAL STRATEGY,
FUTURE THREATS AND DEFENSE SPENDING

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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by

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M.S.O.R, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, 1986

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


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
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ABSTRACT

NATIONAL STRATEGY, FUTURE THREATS, AND DEFENSE SPENDING by
MAJ Daniel M. Gerstein, USA, 184 pages.

In the early 1990s, the world has seen unprecedented changes in the global security environment that have drastically altered the balance of power, and the manner in which nations of the world interact. The evolving international security environment has significant implications for the use of United States military forces in support of national strategic objectives.

In the last two years, the world has seen the fall of the Berlin wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the death of Communism, the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Simply stated, the paradigm has broken. The comfortable, albeit dangerous, post-World War II world that we lived with has become more uncertain and unstable, and potentially more dangerous.

This study investigates the national security strategy of the United States by identifying threats to our interests, our military forces and their employment and current defense budget trends. Using this as a baseline, projections are made concerning the future security requirements in the Post-Cold War world. Post-Cold War national interests are discussed, future threats and the military forces necessary to confront these threats are presented, and necessary budget adjustments are developed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For My Girls

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND.

The world has seen unprecedented changes in the global security environment in the early 1990s that have drastically altered not only the balance of power, but the manner in which the nations of the world interact. It is difficult to envision the Gulf War of 1991 occurring in a Cold War world where the stakes could potentially be as high as a strategic nuclear confrontation between superpowers. While the final disposition of the states of the Soviet Union are not clear at this time, and it may still be too soon to declare the death of the Soviet Union, it is certainly appropriate to declare the demise of one of the world's two superpowers.

This evolving international security environment has interesting and challenging implications concerning the use of United States military forces in support of national strategic objectives. In the last two years, the world has seen the fall of the Berlin wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the death of Communism, the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Simply stated, the paradigm has broken. The comfortable, albeit dangerous, world that we lived with post-World War II is becoming more uncertain and unstable, and potentially more dangerous.

The relatively clear guidelines for the fielding and commitment of military forces based on East-West tensions are no longer applicable as we move into the 21st century. The entire strategic landscape is poorly defined, and the bipolar world has been replaced by a multipolar world with many important and evolving players but only one superpower, the United States. The spread of technology and fundamentalist ideologies has also complicated the process of defining the "threats" to our national interests. This has major implications for the development of national security strategy, the application of the military element of power and the funding of military forces.

Concurrent with the dramatic changes in the world security landscape is the diminishing United States resource base available for funding of the military. As a result, it is necessary to make efficient use of the scarce resources being allocated for defense. While there must be a strong relationship between national strategic interests, the missions that the military will be expected to perform in the future and the fiscal resources allotted to perform these missions, it is becoming more difficult to articulate (or predict) a future threat that is both credible and threatening to the national security of the United States.

This thesis will examine the current and anticipated future linkage between strategic interests, military missions and funding.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS.

This thesis will be focused at the macro level. That is, there is no intent to discuss tradeoffs between and among specific programs or systems. Analysis and assessment of future military requirements will be at the national strategic level.

The analysis conducted in this thesis will examine a period from the present to approximately 2010 -- about 20 years. This is not to imply that anything after 2010 will be irrelevant, but the difficulty in dealing past this point limits the utility of going beyond this timeframe.

No attempt will be made to delve into the budget process or the way in which the military, specifically the individual services of the United States (i.e., the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) with guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense, prepare and submit their budget requests. Analysis of this process is beyond the scope of this thesis.

KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED.

There are several important questions that will be examined during the course of this thesis. They are listed below.

Strategic Interests and Military Forces.

- What have been the strategic interests of the United States in the post-World War II era?
- Under what conditions does the United States commit military forces?
- How will these strategic interests change in light of the evolving world situation?

Budget Analysis.

- How is the defense budget currently being allocated by broad mission categories?

Synthesis.

- Is the United States spending its resources appropriately based on projected strategic interests and anticipated future requirements for military forces?
- What changes in this allocation will be required in the post-Cold War world?

DEFINITIONS.

Strategy.

There is no universally accepted definition of strategy. However, there is general agreement that strategy is concerned with applying resources (means) in a process (ways) to achieve a desired outcome (ends). More simply stated, strategy is the coordination of means and ways to achieve ends. Among strategists, there is also agreement that there are various levels of strategy; many recognize three levels: national (grand), defense and military.

Means can be thought of as the resources or elements of national power that a state has that can be used to achieve its national objectives and interests. Some commonly accepted elements of national power are geography, political, economic, military and national

will (which encompasses such sub-elements as ideology, religion, social, etc.).

Ways can be thought of as the process or methodology that states use to apply their means. It deals with how states actually apply their elements of national power. The programs, commitments and policies of a nation are the processes that are used to translate the objectives into something tangible that can be used to influence other parties.

Ends refer to the desired outcome. They are the objectives and interests that a state wishes to achieve. States apply ways and means in an effort to achieve their ends. More specifics concerning United States' desired ends (i.e., interests and objectives) will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Types of Conflicts.

In conducting the analysis of the types of conflicts that the United States has committed to in its recent history, it is necessary to classify conflicts. The categories that will be utilized in the analysis are low intensity, mid intensity, high intensity and nuclear war. These terms have acquired a number of different interpretations over the years. For the purpose of this thesis, the following rules and characterizations will apply. Figure 1 depicts the levels of conflict.




Figure 1. Types of Conflicts.

Low intensity conflict includes insurgency, counter-insurgency, coup d'etat, terrorism, narco conflict, psychological war, peacekeeping, and other unconventional warfare. These conflicts are normally characterized by a low level of violence and minimal threat to the United States. In many instances, the United States' response to low intensity conflict is covert or sensitive in nature.

Mid intensity conflicts are actions of limited scope which are generally visible in the public domain. They are characterized by the use of conventional forces in conventional roles, although low intensity forces (or special operations forces) are also used. The level of violence associated with these actions is normally mid intensity and the threat to the United States associated with these conflicts is moderate.

High intensity conflicts are considered to be more in keeping with the notion of total non-nuclear warfare. The level of violence is high, and the action stops just short of the employment of nuclear weapons. The threat to the United States is also high in these types of conflicts.

All types of forces, short of nuclear, can be utilized in this type of warfare.

In characterizing conflicts, several constraints will apply. First, the characterization of an action or conflict will focus on the type of forces the United States committed. It will not attempt to capture the type of forces committed by the adversary or the manner in which the adversary viewed the conflict. Secondly, the level of resistance will not be utilized in the characterization process. For example, the United States fought the Vietnam War as if it was a mid intensity conflict, although the North Vietnamese tended to fight the action as a low intensity conflict. As a result, it is categorized as a mid intensity conflict in this analysis. Another example is in Southwest Asia where the threat, Iraq, was clearly overwhelmed and thus failed to mount any sort of organized resistance. This action would still be categorized as a high intensity conflict even though the enemy resistance was intermittent, and the intensity with which they fought was low to mid.

AUTHOR'S NOTES

This thesis was written during a period of significant international change. The author has tried to capture these changes as they occur and incorporate them into the study. However, there are cases such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of a Commonwealth with 11 of the original states where the terminology used in addressing this new union is not complete as the arrangements within the Commonwealth political framework have not been finalized.

The scope of this thesis limits the amount of comparison between weapons systems that will be done. For example, while a question

which is relevant to national security would include tradeoff analysis between various programs to determine the best mix of systems for implementing our strategy, this is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. No attempt will be made, for example, to compare the costs and benefits of one B-2 at a cost of \$.8 Billion per plane with "X" number of F-117 at a cost of "Y" per plane. Additionally, tradeoffs between dissimilar programs such as the B-2 versus fast sealift procurement versus more Army divisions will likewise be avoided.

CONCLUSIONS.

This chapter has introduced the topic that will be examined in this thesis. The intent of the analysis is to examine the potential threats and defense spending trends that will be required to meet the threat challenges during the next 20 years. Perhaps the most critical aspect of this analysis is that it is being written during a period of great change with a very uncertain outcome.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION.

This chapter will examine the current literature on the strategic interests and objectives of the United States. It will also examine the types of conflicts and the regions in which the nation has previously committed forces. Finally, this chapter will present an analysis of the defense budget that has been allocated to the military to provide for defending our national security interests.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES.

Strategic goals and interests are statements of national objectives. The form of these proclamations vary by nation; however, it is fair to generalize that virtually all states do have strategic goals and objectives. In the National Defense University publication, The Art and Practice of Military Strategy [NDU, 1984], there are numerous historical examples of states having and following military strategies which were directly linked to their stated national strategies. It is worth noting that the sources of these proclamations do vary depending on the nature and type of government of a state.

In a totalitarian state, such as the the former Soviet Union, North Korea or Cuba, the strategic goals and objectives are determined by a single ruler or small minority within the state. The more totalitarian the regime, the less the strategic interests and goals are likely to reflect the will of the people of that nation. However, regardless of the source of the objectives, they are still the statement of the direction of a state. For example, the Soviet Union's strategic goals and interests prior to 1991 were determined by the Communist Party and proclaimed in the five year plans, an open source document published periodically. While these goals and objectives may not have matched the will of the people, they certainly provided an azimuth which was followed or attempted to be followed by the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

In contrast, in a democracy or pluralistic society, a nation's stated strategic goals and interests are a manifestation of a nation's national will. That is to say, that the broad overarching direction for a democratic nation is determined by its people. This is the clearly the case for the United States where legislators elected by the people debate and decide our strategic goals and objectives.

The national security interests and objectives of the United States are clearly established in a variety of public documents produced by the US Government. However, the most succinct statement of these interests and objectives is contained in National Security Strategy of the United States which is a document published yearly by The White House. Figure 2 is an extract of these security interests and objectives for 1991. These broad policy interests and objectives are well founded in our national history, and come directly

from the Constitution and the founding fathers. They have been refined over time through a series of public debates in Congress and by the people. It is fair to say that these goals and objectives are closely related to the national will of the American people.

It is clear from an examination of this document that the United States sees connectivity between all of the elements of power as they apply to achieving our national strategy goals and objectives. To accomplish each of the major objectives (i.e., those four statements in bold print in Figure 2), the United States requires all of the elements of power: political, economic, military, geography and national will. For example, in order for the United States to have a "healthy and growing economy," it is necessary to have access to "foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space." Certainly, it would be preferable to use political and economic power to gain this access, but if it is necessary, military power would be applied to ensure this access. The document states,

The elements of our national power - diplomatic and political, economic and military - remain formidable. Yet, the relative importance of these different instruments of policy will change in changing circumstances. Our most difficult decisions will include not only which military forces or programs to adjust, increase, reduce or eliminate, but also which risks can be ameliorated by means other than military capability - means like negotiations, burdensharing, economic and security assistance, economic leverage, and political leadership.

In a new era, we foresee that our military power will remain an essential underpinning of the global balance, but less prominently and in different ways.¹

An examination of the manner in which the United States, as part of the NATO alliance, has dealt with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states during the Cold War period provides insights into how the nation used all of the elements of power to defeat its adversaries [Harding, 1991]. Another document which provides a chronology of the manner in which the United States and NATO matched the Soviet Union is presented in a 1989 Department of State Bulletin entitled "A Short History of NATO."

These documents depict how the United States and NATO showed both the political resolve and the military backbone to convince the Warsaw Pact to capitulate. Politically, the United States continuously condemned the Soviet Union for adventurism, aggression and human rights violations in all available fora while showing national will in the form of a consistent solidarity against their totalitarian regime and ideology. Militarily, the United States created a large nuclear and conventional deterrent force that was positioned to challenge the Soviet Union throughout the world. And finally, economically, the United States isolated the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact by limiting trade and technology transfer with these aggressor nations. Throughout the Cold War, the national will of the American people remained constant and strong against the Soviet ideology. The end result was that the United States prevailed over Soviet led aggression and achieved major national security objectives.²

The extent to which these objectives were met can be examined by looking at previous national security documents. As late as 1990, strategy documents continued to focus on East-West tensions. There

was skeptical mention of the fall of the Berlin Wall which occurred in the fall of 1989 and announced Soviet troop withdrawals from the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. The 1990 documents represented an incremental change from 1989 as had been the case for successive years since the beginning of the Cold War. In contrast to the incremental differences of previous years, the differences between the 1990 and 1991 versions of many of these national security documents are monumental. The East-West tensions have been downplayed and in some cases eliminated. However, the conclusion that the only nation that possesses the power to destroy the United States remains the Soviet Union (or several of the members of the Commonwealth formed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union that will retain large stocks of nuclear weapons) with its large, strategic nuclear arsenal. This trend can be seen in documents such as Military Posture prepared by the Joint Staff and the Annual Report to the President and the Congress prepared by Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with allies, to:

- deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and - should deterrence fail - repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies;
- effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;
- improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities;
- promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for military advantage;
- foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism;
- prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery; and
- reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

National security and economic strength are indivisible. We seek to:

- promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy;
- ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space;
- promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes; and
- achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.

Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

To build such relationships, we seek to:

- strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;
- establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities;
- strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress;
- support Western Europe's historic march toward greater economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer relationship between the United States and the European Community; and
- work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free.

A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy and its ideals are widespread and secure. We seek to:

- maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance;
- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;
- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress;
- aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and
- support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress.

Figure 2. National Security Interests and Objectives of the United States.

Another example of the application of all of the elements of power to achieve national security objectives and interests is Southwest Asia following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.³ The United States once again used political pressure in an attempt to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and restore Kuwait's sovereignty. Direct political pressure on Iraq and indirect pressure through the United Nations and third parties was applied. When this pressure failed to achieve its desired outcome, economic sanctions were imposed in order to force Iraq to leave Kuwait. Simultaneously, military pressure was applied during Operation Desert Shield. The first United States forces to deploy provided the initial military pressure. This initial capability was reinforced with a naval blockade, amphibious forces, air power and ground forces capable of defending Saudi Arabia and repelling an Iraqi attack. The military force was built up to provide an offensive capability sufficient to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Finally, the direct application of the military element of power was demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm. Throughout the crisis, national will and geography continued to be important factors. The national will (i.e., the support of the American people) proved to be critical to the outcome in a positive sense, while the geography (i.e., the distance to deploy forces) proved to be a negative factor that needed to be overcome.

COMMITMENT OF MILITARY FORCES.

What are the conditions under which the United States will commit forces? Are there any rules for determining when and where

the application of military power is appropriate? These are fundamental questions which have concerned strategists and government leaders responsible for ensuring the defense of the United States.

An obvious imperative concerning the use of military power is that its application is not arbitrary or random. It is applied in order to achieve a specific strategic goal or objective. More directly stated, it is utilized to force a state or party to act or not act in a certain way. This notion is certainly not new; Clausewitz stated in On War, "War is a continuation of policy by another means."⁴ He clearly recognized that a state goes to war to achieve a policy goal. Others have articulated similar thoughts concerning the use of military force.

For the United States, these policy goals are clearly stated in the interests and objectives portion of the National Security Strategy document. These are the fundamental interests and objectives that the United States considers to be vital to our sense of nation. However, achievement of the four primary interests and objectives and their component parts is not enough to cause this nation to go to war. If it were, the United States would have been at direct war with the Soviet Union many years ago. They may, however, cause the nation to employ (and deploy) forces as we have done in Europe since the end of World War II under our doctrine of forward defense.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, summed up the linkage between our national strategy and the commitment of forces best when he testified at a Senate Committee prior to Operation Desert Storm. He stated, "What we do in the military flows directly from political decisions that have been made

and from the overall national security strategy that has been set forth by the President."⁵

Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger provides insight into the conditions under which the commitment of the military is appropriate.⁶ The Secretary of Defense and his staff developed a six point checklist which helps to identify the parameters under which military forces can and should be committed (Figure 3). This checklist was presented to the Congress in the Secretary's February 5, 1986 message. Note that the key to the commitment of forces is that it is something that must be entered into cautiously. All of Mr. Weinberger's criterion point to this necessity.

While there certainly are other strategic analysis models available to the strategist, it appears that the Weinberger model has gained credibility within the national security arena. This analytical model has been cited as a tool utilized in the decision process for the two most recent, large-scale examples of the commitment of forces to combat, Panama and the Persian Gulf.⁷ It is simple, very general and can be adapted to virtually any strategic analysis situation. Another important aspect of the model is that it was created and used by a former senior member of government in the accomplishment of his duties as Secretary of Defense.

Sabrosky and Sloane [1988] have done an analysis of the Weinberger criteria. In this analysis, the authors have examined the manner in which the criteria should be satisfied prior to the commitment of military forces. It is worth noting that the Weinberger Criteria do not represent original thought, and is an evolutionary model that can be traced from "Just War Tradition."

This tradition is an historically based doctrine which considers the legal, military and political factors as well as Western tradition and the moral justification associated with the use of force.⁸

Former Secretary of State Shultz also developed a set of criteria for the use of military power which is discussed in Sabrosky and Sloane. However, there are such similarities in the Weinberger and Shultz criteria that it is sufficient to discuss one in order to gain the flavor and nature of both. As a result, the focus will be on the Weinberger criteria in this thesis.

- ✓ **US forces should only be committed to combat in defense of interests vital to our nation or our allies.**
- ✓ **US forces should only be committed in numbers adequate to complete the mission.**
- ✓ **US forces should only be committed when we have clearly defined political and military objectives.**
- ✓ **The relationship between objectives and forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.**
- ✓ **US forces should be committed only when there is reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress.**
- ✓ **US forces should only be committed as a last resort.**

Figure 3. Weinberger's Criteria for the Use of Military Power

The rationale for commitment of forces requires that our nation's or our allies' vital interests are at stake. If vital interests are not at stake then the use of military force should be reconsidered. Policymakers must go into the process of committing forces with the knowledge that, in all likelihood, lives will be lost and the area in which the forces are being committed will be altered significantly. For example, Operation Just Cause in Panama was conducted from December 1989 to January 1990; the aftermath of that operation is still being felt in 1992 as United States forces continue to assist in the post invasion rebuilding of Panama in the ongoing operation, Promote Liberty.

Another requirement is that there must be a clear, concise statement of purpose prior to the commitment of forces. Policymakers as well as military commanders must understand the intent of the commitment of forces and the possible/probable outcomes. It is also imperative that the statement or statements of purpose are realistic and attainable, and there must be contingency planning to account for unforeseen events. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated this necessity in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) when he stated the following:

In Panama last October, the Chiefs did not recommend the use of military force to support an aborted coup because it would not have supported clear political objectives of restoring democracy in Panama or protecting American lives and interests. Yet, two months later, we did recommend the use of military force in December of 1989 because we saw that the use of

military force would be decisive in achieving clear political goals.⁹

Furthermore, it is necessary to ensure that adequate force to accomplish the mission is allocated and available, and that there is support for the commitment of forces. These two criteria are closely related. In a situation where there is strong support for the commitment of forces, it will be considerably easier to commit resources and maintain adequate support, whereas if the commitment is unpopular, the allocation of resources will be difficult to get and maintain.

The final test, and perhaps the most important, is that forces should only be committed as a last resort. If there is another alternative for accomplishing a national objective within the bounds that the political leaders have established, then it should be pursued. This is due to the traumatic effect on a region that has been subjected to the commitment of force and the inherent risk associated with military operations.

Two points should be made concerning the Weinberger model. First, it is worth stating explicitly that all of these criteria should be met before the military element of our national power is utilized; any alternative is inadequate. Sabrosky and Sloane [1988] articulate this requirement clearly throughout their analysis. The second point is based on an observation by the author and concerns the completeness of the Weinberger model. The model does not address the impact of the commitment of forces over time, and therefore tends to be short-sighted. It fails to explicitly consider the long-term impact of the commitment of force to a region. This is something that should also

be considered. Perhaps a more direct question that needs to be addressed is whether the commitment of force will have a positive impact on our interests and objectives in the region over time. If the answer to this question is no, then military force may not be the method that is most appropriate for achieving our national security objectives.

Before moving on, it is necessary to interject a "touch of reality" into the decision to commit military forces. The National Command Authority (NCA), the President and the Secretary of Defense, certainly have the means to respond to all criteria prior to the commitment of forces. However, there are times when the NCA (particularly the President) decides to commit forces before all criteria have been satisfied. Such was the case in Southwest Asia when forces were deployed to the region before there was a strong display of national will. Over time and before the actual combat started, President Bush was able to win the support of the American people and Congress. However, his initial commitment of forces went against the strict application of Weinberger's criteria.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND COMMITMENT OF FORCES.

The current state of military forces in the United States and the commitment of these forces is based on the evolution of our modern military that took place beginning in approximately 1900. (Accounts of this evolution are contained in [NDU, 1984], [Tonelson, 1991] and [Mearsheimer, 1990].) The United States tended to be isolationist in its approach to national strategy at this time. Forces

were committed in conflicts almost exclusively for the protection of United States personnel and property. The United States was a second rate power and became involved reluctantly in conflicts with other nations.

World War I saw the United States become involved in a major conventional conflict. While we were successful in the war, many believed that the United States had done its part in securing the world order, and that we should return to the status quo. This feeling prevailed and following World War I, the United States returned to its isolationist posture. This isolationist trend continued until World War II. However, our experiences in World War II significantly altered our world standing and ability to remain isolationist.

There were four major world powers at the end of the war: France, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the United States was the most powerful nation as a result of our economic capability and by virtue of our sole possession of nuclear weapons. Our economy was left intact during the war, and while restructuring away from a wartime economy was in order, this was clearly easier than the massive rebuilding task facing the other powers. Furthermore, our possession of weapons of mass destruction tipped the balance of power in favor of the United States. France and Britain resumed their roles as allies of the United States and were held under our nuclear umbrella. However, the fundamental differences between the Soviet Union and the United States which had been put aside during the war now resurfaced.

The Soviet Union felt threatened by our nuclear capability. To counter this threat, they retained the large numbers of conventional

forces which had not been demobilized following the war. At the same time, they continued to work toward development of a nuclear capability to counter the United States. In contrast, the United States demobilized a majority of its conventional forces as they were extremely expensive to maintain, and began to rely quite heavily on our nuclear capability to defend our national security interests. The United States' heavy reliance of nuclear weapons, which were perceived to be offensive, troubled the Soviet Union greatly. This chain of events began a competition known today as the nuclear arms race.

At the same time, the United States developed a forward deployed strategy to maintain stability in regions where we had strategic interests. Military forces remained in Europe following the war to deter further aggression on the continent and to hold the Soviets in check. In addition, our forces maintained a foothold in the Pacific to counter Soviet expansionist tendencies in this region.

This move-countermove competition between the United States and the Soviet Union (and indeed East and West) continued for a 45 year period until approximately 1989. This competition involved all of the elements of national power. While the United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct military conflicts, there was animosity between East and West through surrogates which spanned a wide variety of military actions.

Detailed examination of the commitment of forces since 1900 validates this evolution of political and military application of United States power and resources. The information contained in this section is composed of data collected from several sources. America's Small

Wars [Collins, 1991], The War Atlas [Kidron and Smith, 1983], and Instances of the Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1989 [CRS Report for Congress, 1989] were the primary sources of data. These documents were used to provide a general description of the previous commitments of military forces. From these descriptions, it was necessary to make determinations about the categorization and characterization of the various conflicts that the United States has been involved in as these sources did not utilize the same terminology and definitions in presenting their information. The categorization and characterization utilized is based on the definitions presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

It had long been recognized that there are different types of conflicts. The characterization of these conflicts is normally based on the intensity, scale and type of the military commitment. The characterization refers to both level of participation and violence. For example, World War II can be characterized as a high intensity war. In contrast, the Desert One attempted rescue of the hostages held in Iran (1980) can be considered low intensity conflict, while the Vietnam War (1966-1970) is considered to be a mid intensity conflict. These types of characterizations are useful for the understanding and developing of military forces that are necessary for achieving our national strategic objectives.

Combining this high, mid and low intensity construct with the nuclear element yields the "Spectrum of Conflict"¹⁰ (Figure 4). The spectrum of conflict addressed both the likelihood of occurrence and the level of violence associated with the different types of conflicts. The theory was that the likelihood of low intensity conflicts was the

greatest, while the level of violence and threat to the United States was lowest. On the other hand, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict was low, but the level of violence and threat to the United States was the greatest. This was the construct that military analysts utilized in the formulation of doctrine, the funding of military programs and the conceptualization of the application of military power from the end of World War II until the end of the 1980s. Given this view of military conflicts, it is not surprising that a large proportion of the defense budget is allocated to high intensity and nuclear warfare which focused on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact threat.

Another version of the Spectrum of Conflict categorizes conflicts into the following categories: (1) Terrorism, (2) Unconventional Warfare, (3) Minor Conventional Warfare, (4) Major Conventional Warfare, (5) Theater Nuclear Warfare, and (6) Strategic Nuclear Warfare.¹¹ The same relationship concerning the probability of occurrence and risk to the nation hold in this construct. Basically, the smaller, less violent conflicts are the most likely, but the level of violence and threat to the United States is the least. Relating these categories to the ones presented in the previous version of the spectrum helps to define the low, medium, high and nuclear categories from the first version. Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare equates to low intensity conflict, Minor Conventional Warfare equates to mid intensity conflict, Major Conventional Warfare equates to high intensity conflict, and Theater and Strategic Nuclear Warfare equates to Nuclear War.

For ease of discussion, the terms low intensity, mid intensity, high intensity and nuclear war will be utilized throughout the remainder of the discussion.




Figure 4. The Spectrum of Conflict.

Examination of the use of the United States military since 1900 lends credibility to this theory concerning the likelihood of occurrence and level of violence. Table 1 provides a breakdown of intensity of conflicts for the various periods from 1900 to the Present (i.e., 1900 to pre-World War I, World War I to pre-World War II, World War II

to pre-Vietnam War, pre-Vietnam War to 1980, and 1980 to the Present). As noted previously, this data has been collected from several sources, and it has been necessary to make judgments concerning the categorization of the various conflicts. For example, while the Libya raid conducted with Naval and Air Force assets in 1986 was short duration and conducted on a terrorist state (which would tend to put it into the low intensity category), it was a relatively violent action, conducted with state of the art weapon systems and was an overt use of force. Based on this characterization, the action was considered to be a mid intensity conflict for this analysis. Note also that only conflicts in which United States personnel were committed have been counted. As a result several conflicts where the United States only contributed equipment in the form of security assistance have been omitted. Also, strategic nuclear has been left off the table as this conflict has not occurred to date. A complete listing of this data is contained in Appendix A.

Table 1. United States Military Conflicts (1900-Present)

Timeframe	Number of Years	Low	Mid	High	Total
1900 to Pre-WWI (1916)	17	28	0	0	28
WWI (1917) to Pre-WWII (1941)	24	19	1	1	21
WWII (1941) to Pre-Vietnam War (1964)	23	17	2	1	20
Vietnam War (1964) to 1980	16	9	2	0	11
1980 to Present	11	21	4	1	26
Total	91	94	9	3	106

Most of the "conflicts" listed in the period from 1900 to pre-World War I were security operations (i.e., 23 of 28), and most of the incidents occurred in Central America and the Caribbean (i.e., 17 of 28). Another common characteristic is that the Marine Corps was the force of choice for most of these conflicts. The conflicts tended to be small incidents where a handful of Marines were sent to protect United States personnel and property.

This trend continued after World War I as well. During the timeframe from 1917 to 1941, United States forces were involved in 21 actions of which 17 were security operations. However, during this period, commitments of forces in the Caribbean diminished while commitments in Europe greatly increased as Europe became the most prevalent region for the commitment of United States forces. There were still several actions in Central America during this period. All conflicts from 1917 to 1941 were low intensity with the exception of World War I (high intensity) and the beginning of the Naval War with Germany which was categorized as a mid intensity conflict.

The 23 year period from 1941 to 1964 saw a slight decrease in the number of conflicts per year as well as the in the number of security operations. Most of these military commitments were conventional forces applied to low intensity conflicts. Only three of the 20 actions were not considered low intensity. World War II was a high intensity conflict, and China in 1948-49 and the Korean War were mid intensity conflicts. The premier venue for these conflicts shifted from the Caribbean, Europe and Central America where they had been for the previous 41 years to East Asia.

The trend towards commitment of forces in East Asia continued from the beginning of the Vietnam War in 1964 to 1980. Six of 11 actions where United States forces were committed were in East Asia. Once again, most of the conflicts were low intensity actions. Only the Vietnam War and the tensions in Korea in 1976 were considered to be mid intensity conflicts in this analysis. Another important trend noted is that all 11 actions during this period were conventional forces applied in low intensity conflicts.

From 1980 to 1991, several important trends emerge. First, there were 26 actions during this 11 year period; this is over two conflicts per year which is the highest rate recorded during the periods under consideration. Secondly, the predominate locations of these conflicts has changed during this timeframe. The Middle East and Africa, eight and six respectively, have accounted for over half of the 26 actions, while Central America continues to be a trouble spot with five actions. Thirdly, the violence of the conflicts has tended to increase during this period. The number of mid and high intensity conflicts compared to the number of low intensity conflicts has risen. Five of 26, or 20 percent, of the actions were mid or high intensity. The mid and high intensity conflicts include: two against Libya (1981-Downing of Libyan jets and 1986-Raid on Libya), the Persian Gulf (1987-88 - Reflagging of tankers and associated actions), Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989-90), and Operation Desert Shield/Storm in Southwest Asia (1990-91).

One aspect of these conflicts that is not readily apparent from the analysis of the data is the degree to which superpower tensions contributed to these military commitments. Virtually all of the

actions where United States forces were committed post World War II (i.e., post 1945) can be directly linked to the United States-Soviet tensions dominated by the clash between democracy/capitalism versus communism. It is only recently with the demise of the Soviet empire and its strong power base that this source of conflict has been alleviated.

From approximately 1986 to the present, the United States has committed forces against regional dictators (without Soviet sponsorship) such as Khomeini in Iran, Noriega in Panama and Hussein in Iraq. Another new area for the commitment of forces has been in the drug war; most of this commitment has been focused on Central and South America.

Overall, the data suggests several other important and concerning trends. The United States appears to be very willing to commit forces worldwide in order to accomplish its national security goals and objectives. Both the number of conflicts per year and level of violence of these conflicts are increasing. Where security operations dominated the list of actions in the early 1900s, conventional operations are dominating the late 1900s. The level of violence in these conflicts is directly related to the proliferation of heavy conventional armaments worldwide. Most nations of the world have some armored capability, while most industrialized nations and second world powers have main battle tanks in their national inventories.

The Spectrum of Conflict and the analysis of conflicts discussed above remain applicable, however the Spectrum of Conflict construct has been replaced by the Operational Continuum.¹² The Operational

Continuum concept provides a recognition that (1) there is peacetime competition between potential adversaries, (2) conflicts do not merely occur; they are an extension of the political process and reflect a movement out of the normal peacetime competition phase, (3) that conflicts (i.e., in this case conflict is meant to imply a minor action or low intensity conflict) can lead to either war or a return to normal peacetime competition without reaching the hostilities phase, and (4) that once hostilities commence, there must be a posthostilities phases before return to normal peacetime competition can occur. The Operational Continuum is depicted in Figure 5. (Note: This figure represents a combining of the information contained in FM 100-25 and unpublished work done by a former Command and General Staff College instructor, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Parry (USA, Ret.).)




Figure 5. The Operational Continuum.

As in the Spectrum of Conflict, all (i.e., the political, economic, military and national will) elements of power can be utilized in working towards one's goals and objectives.

Typically, military forces have been designed for the hostilities portion of the operational continuum. Great attention is paid to the warfighting ability of the force, while only secondary attention is paid to those forces that could be utilized in the pre- and posthostilities portion of the continuum. In contrast, the hostilities phase tends to be shorter than the other phases. As an example, in both of the recent major commitments of forces in Panama and Southwest Asia, the actual combat portion of the dispute lasted only a small fraction of the total conflict.

The Secretary of Defense's annual report to Congress [OSD, 1991] discusses the requirements for military forces. It states that there must be adequate forces across the entire continuum for the United States to be able to reach its national security goals and objectives. This implies that there must be peacetime forces for establishing a presence, conducting a show of force or demonstration and even special operations forces for peacetime purposes; forces for escalation in time of conflict; and warfighting forces capable of deterring and, if deterrence fails, defeating potential enemies.

The figure also depicts the various intensities of warfare. The manner in which it is depicted is not to imply that one proceeds from low to mid to high to nuclear warfare. It is possible that low intensity warfare could lead directly to high intensity, for example.

Another interesting aspect of this escalation is that the nuclear component of the force including its deterrent value only appears to have had application against a single potential adversary, the former Soviet Union. The threat of nuclear escalation against smaller, nuclear or non-nuclear nations such as Panama and Iraq does not appear to have been credible as they remained belligerent and engaged in anti-United States actions despite our possession of these weapons of mass destruction.

FUTURE THREATS AND UNITED STATES FORCE REQUIREMENTS.

This section of the literature review will examine the anticipated future threats to United States interests and goals. Acquiring information on this topic has been complicated by recent events in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Literature published before 1989 tends to be of limited use as it fails to take into account the dramatic changes in the international landscape as the world moves toward a multipolar construct with only one superpower, the United States. Works published prior to 1989 usually do not address the potential for a disintegration of the Warsaw Pact or dissolution of the Soviet Union. The more farsighted of these documents may predict an eventual break up of the Warsaw Pact and even the Soviet Union; however, they usually predict that these events will occur in the long term. The rapid pace of change thus dictates that the primary source of literature for this subject are those documents published recently (i.e., 1989 and later).

Another difficulty in researching this topic is caused by attempting to examine this subject following the Gulf War. After the

beginning of the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, many defense analysts and policymakers were calling for massive reductions in defense spending commensurate with the reduction in the threat. DOD was cautioning against overly zealous reductions as events in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were still potentially threatening and the Third World continued to be dangerous and unpredictable. Critics were accusing DOD of inventing threats to justify defense budgets. However, the invasion of Kuwait on the morning of 2 August tended to silence critics and demonstrated the volatile nature of the third world. In post Gulf War literature, analysts generally agree that a credible and capable force will be required. Thus, most literature tends to be moderate towards future threats and defense funding. That is, it recognizes the reduced Soviet threat while considering the increased threat of regional conflicts.

In order to fully examine this subject, the potential future threats should be analyzed in terms of certain characteristics. They are: (1) United States strategic interest endangered, (2) Type of threat or conflict, (3) Likely region of conflict, (4) Type of United States forces, and (5) Timelines for employment of forces.

By way of an introduction to this topic, an examination of what several of the key players believe to be the future threats to United States national security is helpful for establishing a background for further analysis. President Bush has made numerous public statements concerning the future security environment and the requirement for military forces. In a speech entitled "Reshaping Our Forces" given at the Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990, he discusses the lessening of East-West tensions, the significantly decreased

likelihood of a Soviet short warning attack on Western Europe, and the spread of democracy throughout the world. This speech was delivered just hours after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. On the size and quantity of forces to be maintained by the United States, the President comments, "In a world less driven by an immediate threat to Europe and the danger of a global war - in a world where the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of our regional contingencies and peacetime presence - we know that our forces will be smaller."¹³ In this speech, President Bush clearly establishes the "need to guard our enduring interests" while restructuring rather than just simply reducing our forces. He states that this restructuring is necessary as the nation moves from its Soviet focused defense posture into a more global view of United States security interests. Concerning regions of importance to the United States in the future, he explicitly states that America will have important interests in Europe, the Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. While these regions will continue to gain relative importance as the Soviet threat diminishes, President Bush commented that we cannot lose sight of the significant nuclear and conventional capability that the Soviet Union still possesses. Another important theme covered in the speech dealt with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in third world countries and the many "renegade regimes and unpredictable rulers" that pose a threat to the United States and its allies.

President Bush concluded his 2 August 1990 speech with the three elements that he considered vital for meeting the nation's future security needs. They are a strong Research and Development

(R&D) program, continued force readiness and the ability for rapid response. He stated that R&D and the technological advantage that it has brought the United States in previous confrontations will play a big role in all future conflicts. President Bush discussed the long lead time required for fielding weapons and the need to continue the R&D process. On the subject of readiness, he stated that the military forces of the United States must continue to be fully trained and able to respond to any and all requirements for military forces from peacetime competition to nuclear warfare. He also discusses the continuing importance of the reserves, but implies that they will need to be restructured and reduced in size in response to emerging requirements. Finally, the President outlined the requirement for rapid response. Specifically, he stated that forces needed to be prepared to respond to "threats that may emerge with little or no warning," and that this response capability will depend on the speed and agility of the military. He stated that prepositioned material such as the Prepositioned Material Configured to Units Sets (POMCUS) utilized in Europe with its inherent inflexibility will not be as critical as the development of adequate strategic airlift and sealift assets which would allow for the required global reach and power projection.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, has also made numerous public pronouncements and has published several articles concerning the anticipated future threats to the nation's security and requirements for forces [Powell 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b]. While it is not surprising, it is worth noting that the pronouncements made by the Chairman closely mirror those

made by the President. This is to be expected as the Chairman is the principle military advisor to the President.

In a speech delivered at Kansas State University on 8 November 1989, General Powell provided insights into the necessity for military forces. He stated, "No matter how sound your political system, how powerful your politics, how dynamic your economy, how strong your values, without the armed forces to back them up, a democratic people can be at risk."¹⁴

General Powell emphasized the need for continued reliance of alliances and for the United States to maintain its leadership role in these partnerships. He states that maintaining and modernizing the nation's strategic nuclear arsenal and conventional forces, in order that they remain strong and ready, will be essential to America's defense in the post-Cold War environment. A theme throughout his speech was that the United States must enhance the ability to deploy all of its forces (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) world-wide in a crisis situation.

In an article published in 1990 [Powell, 1990], the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs elaborates on some of the points which he briefly discussed in the above presentation. Concerning the purposes of our military forces, he writes, "Our global military posture is designed to keep the peace. The presence and readiness of our armed forces, in the United States and overseas, prevents small crises from becoming big ones, deters major hostilities, reassures allies and provides for dealing with unforeseeable contingencies wherever they may arise."¹⁵ While he notes that there will be changes in the national security landscape, he implies that previous national security policy

requirements will continue to be relevant statements of the purposes of our military forces.

General Powell discusses the Soviet Union in some detail. He examines the modernization of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the significant reduction in conventional forces that is planned and ongoing, and other Soviet modernization and R&D programs (e.g., space programs). He presents several conclusions that will be important in guiding the restructuring of our armed forces: (1) the Soviet Union will continue to be a military superpower, (2) until democratic changes in the Soviet Union are "firmly rooted", the United States would be accepting undue risk by making "irrevocable" and "sweeping" changes to our military, (3) other threats to American interests do not dissipate because of a retrenched Soviet Union, and (4) the "fundamentals of our national strategy remain sound." A summary which best describes the Chairman's overall vision for the future military forces of the United States is presented below:

We must continue to provide a credible strategic deterrent through a modern Triad, protect our interests globally, retain a highly mobile and ready force for crises and contingencies, and through all of the coming restructuring avoid foreclosing options for hedging against a new or renewed threat.¹⁶

The Commandant of the Marines Corps, General Gray [Gray, 1991] predicts a post-Cold War world which is less stable and more uncertain. He notes several troubling trends that are emerging including increasing number of insurgencies which will threaten United States citizens and our access to markets and critical

resources, terrorist incidents/illicit drug trafficking, increasing dissatisfaction among what he refers to as the "have-nots" and an increase in population that will compound the growing disparity among the "have" and "have-nots." General Gray presents several emerging trends which he believes will dominate the future world security landscape.

- Stable bi-polar world being replaced by an unstable and unpredictable multi-polar world.
- Emergence of regional economic, political and military powers and alliances to fill power vacuum.
- Economic power, and the influence it brings to world affairs, is in the hands of more players. The Pacific has gained importance to the United States, and the impact of the economic union in Europe will be important as well.
- Developing nations are demanding a greater return on their natural resources in order to increase economic standing and thus political power.
- Nationalism is becoming a more important factor in international relations.
- As nations achieve military power, they are tending to apply this power to achieve their strategic objectives which is contributing to instability.
- Proliferation of high-technology weapons is making potential conflicts more likely and more dangerous.

Concerning the strategy of the United States, General Gray sees little overall change in the future as much of our national strategy is based on our history, national character and geography. These

factors are not likely to be changed or easily modified. He envisions a national strategy based on power projection which is applicable across the spectrum of conflict throughout the world. General Gray describes his vision of our national strategy in the following paragraph,

We are a global power with aerospace, continental and maritime interests. However, our national character remains maritime. Our geography, extent of territory and worldwide economic and political interests make us dependent on free access to the world's markets and natural resources as well as the unimpeded use of the sea. Equally important, it is in our national interest to maintain stability around the globe, since without it we may be unable to guarantee the safety of our citizens abroad, protect our global interests, assist those people and nations who share our values, or have access to the markets and resources needed for our economic prosperity.¹⁷

Implied in the above quotation, is the necessity to maintain an appropriate mix of naval, air and land forces required to accomplish those tasks or missions that General Gray identified. In fact, General Gray believes that the previous Eurocentric focus tended to relegate the air and naval forces to a supporting role. He sees a future United States military with a more balanced treatment of these three components. He states that "flexible general purpose forces" are the type of forces necessary in the future to handle envisioned threats. He goes on to describe the requirement for a future force as "versatile, fast-moving, highly mobile, hard-hitting, sustainable and always at a high state of readiness."¹⁸ It is worth noting that he incorrectly states that a majority of current forces were designed for

and applicable only to a threat in Europe, and that they are only marginally useful in other scenarios. The successful use of Army VII Corps forces in Desert Storm tend to negate this assertion. However, his basic point concerning the utility of a mix of naval, air and land forces remains viable.

Concerning specifics of the future forces, General Gray reiterates the importance of continuing to modernize our forces and capitalize on the United States' technological advantages. Furthermore, he stresses the need for strategic mobility forces that would enable the nation to project its military power. Another important point made by General Gray is that there must be adequate active forces to respond to envisioned missions; these missions include deterrence, forward presence in critical regions and crisis response.

Former Army Chief of Staff, General Vuono has also published several articles which present the strategic landscape he envisions for the future. Vuono [1989, 1990] are representative of these publications. While his message concerning the types of threats that the United States is likely to face in the future is similar to those presented by General Gray, he focuses less on a maritime nature while presenting his concept of a general threat. He states, "...the key to the defense of our vital interests in the next century will rest with our conventional forces - forces that can be adapted quickly to deal with the even-widening range of challenges occasioned by an era of uncertainty and change of historic magnitude. The contributions to our national security provided by conventional forces are unique and cannot be replaced by our strategic nuclear arsenal, no matter how modern, how destructive, or how accurate it may be."¹⁹

General Vuono discusses, in some detail, requirements for military forces that can operate across the spectrum of conflict from peacetime engagement to major war. He emphasizes the necessity and benefits of having strategic conventional forces that are capable of forward presence operations, nation building, security assistance and deterrence. He uses the phrase "versatile (able to respond to a widening array of challenges), deployable (able to project substantial combat power rapidly wherever our interests are threatened) and lethal (to bolster deterrence and lethal to ensure defense)"²⁰ to describe the forces that the nation, and specifically the Army, will require in the future.

Concerning future threats to the United States, General Vuono articulates the following trends in his White Paper entitled "A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond." These trends are:

- Increased economic competition and the growth of new economic leaders.
- Growth in alliance and coalition strategy to accomplish security objectives.
- A need to be cautious, yet optimistic concerning developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
- Proliferation of sophisticated weapons in the developing world which implies that there is an increasing number of nations capable of engaging in sustained, mechanized land campaigns. (He cites the fact that at least a dozen developing countries have more than 1,000 main battle tanks.)

- Continued challenge associated with low intensity conflicts such as drug trafficking, terrorism, insurgency, and subversion of legitimate democratic regimes.

General Crist (USMC, Retired), former Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command has written a detailed article on future United States military strategy which was presented in Strategic Review [Crist, 1990]. General Crist presents a balanced treatment of the future force requirements. The article was written after Desert Shield commenced but prior to Desert Storm. The article is best summarized by the following passage:

Both global change and fiscal trends in the United States portend a fundamental shift in U.S. military strategy away from previous reliance on forward-deployed forces toward power-projection from the continental United States. Such a prospective strategy needs to be outlined today in order to give meaningful guidance to the reductions process. The strategy calls for structured force packages containing mixes of both light and heavy elements rapidly deployable anywhere on the globe, for requisite sealift and airlift capabilities, for pre-positioning of materiel in key regions, and for strengthened Reserve forces and an expanded base structure within the United States. It heralds a commensurate shift in the political underpinnings of strategy from multilateral alliances to bilateral diplomacy and understandings.²¹

In terms of the future threat environment, General Crist sees a significant shift from a forward deployed to power projection strategy. The Soviet threat is diminishing thus allowing forces that were forward deployed primarily to counter this threat to be redeployed. Also, nations such as the Philippines where the United

States has large forward deployed bases are reexamining their relationships, access agreements and basing rights that they have with the United States. The implication of these changes is that the United States is going to have to develop a power projection strategy rather than simply rely on the "375 overseas bases and nearly half-million deployed United States forces."²²

Specific requirements for future forces that General Crist projects are:

- Greater reliance on joint and combined operations. Allies will have to share a greater responsibility in their own defense.
- A strong nuclear deterrent will remain an importance part of the nations strategy. However, nuclear modernization needs to be reexamined in light of the evolving world situation. He clearly states that the nation should shift toward more mobile, flexible and survivable systems such as land based mobile systems, submarines and air-launched cruise missiles, and move away from systems such as the fixed silos and penetrating bombers such as the B-1 and B-2.
- A reconfiguring of conventional forces to respond to low intensity conflict as well as conventional warfare is required. He sees a shift to regional instabilities in the third world as areas for employing the armed forces. General Crist further points out that these conflicts are unpredictable and have the potential for rapid escalation. He points out that 12 countries in the third world have over 1000 tanks, several nations are developing long-range missiles and the proliferation of chemical weapons pose a serious threat to our forces. These trends require the United States forces to have an appropriate heavy-light mix to deal with future foreseeable threats.

To be able to respond to these potential threats, the Navy and the Air Force need to place more emphasis on strategic sealift and airlift, respectively, for the deployment of Army and Marine forces.

Another aspect of preparing for this type of deployment is increased reliance on pre-positioning of equipment and other war materiel.

- A new focus on the Navy-Marine employment combination away from a Soviet oriented posture and more focused on third world issues and events. Specifically, he states that the Navy should shift from forward deployed carrier battle groups and the maritime strategy to refocus on missions such as controlling the sealanes, moving troops and providing support to amphibious operations.

- Enhance the Army and Air Force rapid deployment capability. This should be done by maintaining airborne and special operations units capable of rapid deployment. At the same time additional emphasis on strategic mobility for the projection of heavy forces is paramount.

- Develop a heavier reliance on Reserves. General Crist proposes a restructuring of the Army and Air Force Reserves. Forces that are reduced from the active structure should be transferred to the Reserves for all services. This would give the country the ability to surge in time of crisis and respond to global war if necessary.

Overall, Crist's article provides a well articulated framework for examining the future threats to the nation and the forces that will be required to support our national security objectives. The balanced treatment of all services tends to lend credibility to the article as well.

Congress is another source that defines future threats to the United States national security and the forces that will be funded to respond to these threats. The Constitution explicitly mandates Congress' responsibility in this area. Specifically, our Constitution establishes that "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."²³ The Constitution goes on to state that Congress has the power "to declare war; ... to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States...."²⁴ Clearly, the constitution establishes the degree of responsibility of the Congress for providing for the defense of the country. Of course, implied in the organizing and equipping of forces to defend national interests is the determination of threats to our security. As a result, statements by key legislators from this body are excellent sources of information on this topic.

Senator Nunn (Democrat-Georgia), who is Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has made numerous public pronouncements concerning the potential threats to national security in the post-Cold War environment [Nunn 1990, 1990a]. He lists five major characteristics of the future threat environment [Nunn 1990]. Note that the article was published in 1990, so Senator Nunn continually discusses the Soviet Union rather than Russia or the new Commonwealth.

- The threat of a large scale Warsaw pact attack against Western Europe has been virtually eliminated, and the threat of a

Soviet "go-it-alone" attack across Eastern Europe against the West is remote.

- A Soviet attempt to reestablish a credible threat of a large-scale threat would require lengthy mobilization and would provide ample warning and indications to the United States and our allies.

- Positive trends in the conventional arena have not been matched by the Soviets in the nuclear arena.

- The danger of unauthorized or accidental nuclear weapons release has been heightened by turmoil and tension in the Soviet Union.

- Possible contingencies in and around the Persian Gulf pose serious risks to United States' security interests. He sees the primary threat to national security interests in the region as the potential for disruption of Western access to oil reserves. (It is worth noting that Senator Nunn's assessment of threats was published in April 1990 which is four months prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.)

In a speech delivered to the Senate in April 1990 [Nunn, 1990a], Senator Nunn outlines a new military strategy based on the future threats that he envisions. The remarks are tempered by the realization that there is a significant difference in what the military would require in an unconstrained budget environment and what will actually be available. The five elements of Senator Nunn's new strategy are:

- 1) Maintain a strong, credible strategic nuclear deterrent force at lower levels and with greater stability. Continue nuclear modernization (including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)). However, develop only one Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).

Test the B-2 thoroughly prior to committing to full scale production. Delete the requirement for a land-based short range nuclear weapon - he states that this type of system no longer has a place in the national defense strategy.

2) Reduction in forward deployed forces consistent with reductions in the threat. This includes emphasis on reception forces; austere forward stationing, emphasis on lighter, more lethal forces; emphasis on mobility forces; and re-evaluation of battlegroup deployments; retire older, single purpose combat systems.

3) Greater utilization of the Reserves. Senator Nunn purposes increasing the accessibility (i.e., availability to conduct operational missions); increase the number of aircraft in the Reserves; transfer missions to the Guard and Reserves; and increase the use of Navy Reserves.

4) Employ a concept of flexible readiness that would provide for varying degree of readiness depending on mission requirements, and;

5) A better management and resource strategy focused on getting the most out of limited resources. This includes the notion of "fly before buy;" emphasis on product improvements over new starts; maintaining technological superiority; eliminating excessive overhead in prime contractors; streamlining headquarters organizations; product rate "stretchouts"; and cooperative research and development.

Senator Nunn identifies many areas where there are potential savings for the military. However, a note of caution is in order. Both of these Nunn references were published prior to Desert Storm. As a result, several of the lessons from the operation such as the inability

of some of the Reserve combat formations to respond rapidly without significant train-up time or the necessity for heavy armored forces are not incorporated into his discussion.

Senator McCain has also written on the need for a strategy in the new postwar era [McCain, 1990]. He identifies two strategic priorities for the 1990s. First, the United States needs to maintain a nuclear deterrent force which is sized to the threat. This means that modernization must be realistic and tempered by the capabilities of potential nuclear adversaries. He states that a penetrating bomber and a small ICBM are not necessary additions to the nuclear inventory. Secondly, the nation must "reshape our long-term military capabilities around a new approach to maritime strategy that provides for the security of Northeast Asia, the West's oil supplies, and a host of low-level contingencies in Latin America, the Middle East, and other regions."²⁵ He goes on to state that the nation needs to develop a new maritime and power projection strategy and force mix to respond to future threats in Europe, Asia, the Gulf and Latin America. Senator McCain's strategy would continue to emphasize the naval aspect of power projection over that of the other services. For example, he points to the importance of the aircraft carrier and battleship in power projection. While he states that forces in Europe should be cut drastically, he believes that forces in East Asia and the Pacific should remain at current levels. Like Senator Nunn, McCain also comments on the necessity of light forces (especially special operations, airborne and air assault forces) while only briefly discussing the potential for heavy armor and mechanized force employment.

Senator McCain has some important points concerning the future strategy of the United States; however, he tends to overstate the importance of the Navy at the expense of the other services. Furthermore, the article was written prior to Desert Storm and suffers from the same inadequacies as Senator Nunn's comments.

Former President Nixon delivered a speech in December 1990 in which he discusses his perceptions concerning the future threats to national security. He cautions about the degree to which the nation can afford to disarm in the post-Cold War. Nixon believes that nuclear deterrence has been and will continue to be a necessary part of the United States strategy. Furthermore, he states "Keeping an American military presence in Europe is important. Keeping one in Asia is indispensable if we are to have peace in the Pacific."²⁶ The fear of the Japanese by other Pacific rim nations such as Korea, China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia would force alliances which would be unstable and could diminish chances for peace in the region. Also, the political structure in China remains far from democratic, and is potentially threatening to the region as well.

There are also many defense analysts, academics, contractors and government officials that have been published on this topic of future national security issues ([Cannistraro, 1991], [Copper, 1990], [Deitchman, 1990], [Etzold, 1990], [Gray, 1990], [Mearsheimer, 1990], [Motley, 1991], [Pfaltzgraff, 1990], [Sarkesian and Williams, 1990], [Tonelson, 1991] to name a few). This chapter only highlights this group's findings. More detailed findings are contained in Appendix B of this thesis. The intent of this appendix is to provide a more

exhaustive account of several of the more noteworthy analyses in this area.

Many of the conclusions from high level policymakers and generals presented previously were developed with the assistance of this community of defense experts. Therefore, to enumerate on all of these individuals writings would do little to enhance understanding of this subject. Most tend to center around a handful of central themes.

While there are a wide variety of specific conclusions these analysts have drawn, they all tend to agree on several general trends. Mr. Etzold, a defense contractor, identifies the three major trends quite succinctly. He states,

These general trends are discernable globally:
(1) diffusion of power in the world; (2) relative decline in the ability of the Soviet Union and the United States directly to determine or even, in some cases much influence results on particular matters in politics, economics and even military affairs; (3) growing international economic interdependence coupled with an increase in the applicability as well as the effectiveness of economic muscle as contrasted with sheer military might.²⁷

Analysts portend that these trends translate to a potential for economic competition that could escalate to military confrontation, an increased potential for regional conflicts, and a proliferation of technology and weaponry. Pfaltzgraff has included a table which depicts the projected spread of high tech weaponry through 1999 (Table 2). He also states that by the second decade of the next century, 40 nations are likely to have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The ramifications of this sort of technology

proliferation are obvious and have been commented on by many of the analysts. Furthermore, while the table presents expected proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it does not address the proliferation of conventional weapons systems which is another area of concern that has been discussed by defense analysts. Note that in the table, South Yemen is listed. Recently, North and South Yemen were united into Yemen.

Table 2. Technology Proliferation - 1999.

Country	Ballistic Missiles			Weapons Production	
	Short	Intermediate	ICBM	Biological/ Chemical	Nuclear
Argentina		✓			✓
Brazil	✓	✓		✓	✓
Cuba	✓			✓	
Egypt	✓	✓		✓	
Ethiopia				✓	
India	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Iran	✓	✓		✓	✓
Iraq	✓	✓		✓	✓
Israel	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Korea, North	✓			✓	✓
Korea, South	✓			✓	✓
Libya	✓	✓		✓	
Pakistan	✓			✓	✓
Romania	✓	✓		✓	✓
Saudi Arabia		✓			
South Africa	✓	✓		✓	✓
Syria	✓	✓		✓	
Taiwan	✓	✓		✓	✓
Vietnam				✓	
Yemen, South	✓			✓	

Regional trends that tend to be accepted within the defense community include the movement of Eastern and Western Europe toward independence from the superpowers, and the increasing potential for militarism in Asia as a result of rapid economic development.

Asia is a region that most analysts agree has a potentially unstable and uncertain future. Asian Defence Journal comments:

Whilst there has been substantial development towards security settlement in Europe, there has been no such equivalent move in the Asia-Pacific region: the two Koreas are still antagonistically divided; there are still a considerable number of unresolved territorial disputes throughout Asia, of which the India-China and Pakistan-India land borders and South China Sea borders are of most concern; the political future of Hong Kong is unclear; and the Cambodian issue yet to be resolved.²⁸

The rise of nationalism and fundamentalism is another troubling trend which has significant implications on the prospects for world security. These forces are not necessarily bad, however combined with radical leadership and the rapid destabilization that has accompanied their growth, there is cause for concern. Specifically, Islamic fundamentalism has become more important as different nations and peoples are clashing with and uniting against the West. This trend continues to become stronger as the movement gains momentum. Nationalism, as has been displayed by the Baltic Republics, is just beginning to run its course in many regions. The overall impact of these two powerful forces, fundamentalism and

nationalism, on the world security environment is uncertain and bears considerable attention according to analysts.

Another area of agreement between defense analysts is the inevitable personnel reduction of all of our armed forces and the decreasing defense budgets that can be expected. A common theme for the military is learning to make maximum use of the scarce budget dollars appropriated. Inherent in this maximizing of scarce resources is the restructuring of the acquisition process.

DEFENSE BUDGET.

One cannot understand the defense budget without examining the context within which it was developed. There are two overriding considerations which have combined to cause cries for extreme reductions in the real growth of the military budget: the state of the United States economy, and a perceived reduction in the threat to United States interests.

The United States has entered into a period of economic recession. While the nation has endured worst economic difficulties in our history, national sentiments are pushing for a decrease in defense spending in order to tend to domestic issues. Examples include nuclear waste clean-up, aid for troubled savings and loan associations, improvements in education, aid for the homeless, and long-term medical care. Efforts aimed at reversing these trends are ongoing.²⁹

The biggest factor which has led to the economic downturn is the national deficit. It is likely that all federal spending, including defense will be affected by attempts to reduce the size of the budget

deficit. However, even with major budget reduction initiatives, deficits will probably remain high for some years to come. Thus, it follows that defense budgets are likely to remain austere during this period as well.³⁰

The second consideration concerns the perceived reduction in the threat to United States interests. For over 40 years, the primary threat to the United States was considered to be the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Defense budgets had been based on the Warsaw Pact threat.³¹ Even where the Pact was not a direct threat, the United States found itself combatting the spread of the Soviet ideology in surrogate states such as Cuba, Angola and Vietnam. When it was announced in the fall of 1989 that the Berlin Wall would be dismantled, the military and the nation found itself with few understandable and articulatable threats. The system that the nation had developed for creating and funding military forces no longer seemed to apply. The reasoning went along the lines that since the threat had been eliminated, the forces dedicated to that threat could in turn be eliminated or drastically reduced. The money to be saved from these reductions became known as the "Peace Dividend."

It is ironic that since the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the "reduction" in threats to our interests, the United States has committed forces in two major conflicts: Operations Just Cause in Panama and Desert Shield/Storm in Southwest Asia. These were the largest commitments of United States forces since the Vietnam War. Equally ironic, but not totally unpredictable, was the military success in both of these operations although the forces involved were developed at a time when the focus was on the Soviet threat.

The initial budget proposal from the White House for the FY 1990-94 called for approximately \$1.5 trillion for defense over the five year period.³² Based on the economic and threat considerations discussed above, this budget plan was put in jeopardy. The economic situation appears to be in worse shape than thought at the time the White House published the plan, and the Soviet threat has diminished at a far more rapid pace than initially predicted. These two factors have accelerated calls for sharper decreases in military spending.

The Annual Report to the President and the Congress for 1991 which is published yearly by the Secretary of Defense depicts the impact of the reduction on the services [OSD, 1991]. The Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 budget reflects an 11 percent reduction in real growth. While the real growth reduction throughout the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) continues, it does become more modest as it settles out to approximately 3 percent negative real growth per year from FY 92 to FY 96. Another indication of this reduction is the defense outlays as a share of the Gross National Product (GNP). Since 1973, the defense budget has amounted to between five and six percent of the GNP. By 1993, defense expenditures will account for only about 4.3 percent of the GNP.

As expected, these projected reductions in the defense budget will have a significant impact on force structure of all of the services. For example, in the Secretary of Defense's annual report to Congress and the President for 1991, the following reduction have been cited for the period FY 1990 to FY 1995,

- Army Divisions: From 28 (18 Active) to 18 (12 Active)
- Navy Aircraft Carriers: From 16 to 13

- Carrier Air Wings: From 15 to 13
- Navy Battleships: From 4 to 0
- Total Battle Force Ships: From 545 to 451
- Tactical Fighter Wings: From 36 (24 Active) to 26 (15 Active); and
- Strategic Bombers: From 268 to 181

The 1990 National Defense portion of the United States Government Budget [Budget, 1990] subdivides the military appropriations into 11 broad mission areas (Table 3). The mission areas and the dollar amounts (in billions) allocated to each provide an interesting perspective on the manner in which the United States apportions its defense budget. The natural inclination when examining the budget is to attempt to do a direct cost-benefit application. That is, since Intelligence and Communications amounts for approximately 10 percent of the budget (i.e., \$32.8B out of \$320.9B), it should provide approximately 10 percent of the combat power of the nation. However, this attempt to equate the cost and benefits directly is fruitless as much of the defense budget, as in the case of Intelligence and Communications, is support and thus does not contribute directly to the combat power of the nation. However, it is fair to say that without this capability, our ability to defend our national security interests would be severely impacted. This observation will be important throughout this thesis. There will be no attempt to determine dollar amounts that should be reallocated between mission areas. Rather, areas where spending patterns should be altered will be identified.

While the mission categories are self explanatory, it is worth highlighting several of the areas. All categories include the cost of

operating and maintaining forces and systems, and the cost to procure new systems and reorganize existing forces.

There are three general types of combat forces funded in the table. They are strategic, general purpose and special operations forces. Strategic forces are those concerned with the conduct and execution of strategic nuclear warfare. These forces are focused on the Soviet threat and are the deterrent forces on which we have relied for the past 40 years. General purpose forces operate across the operational continuum, but are more focused on mid to high intensity warfare. Special operating forces are also utilized across the continuum in both a covert and overt manner.

Table 3. Mission Categories for Defense Spending.

Major Missions and Programs	1988 Actual	Estimate		
		1989	1990	1991
Strategic Forces	19.8	21.2	23.4	27.6
General Purpose Forces	114.9	112.8	117.8	122.8
Intelligence and Communications	28.3	29.6	31.7	32.8
Airlift and Sealift	4.4	5.4	6.3	7.1
Guard and Reserve	16.9	17.2	17.2	17.8
Research and Development	28.4	29.1	32.1	32.6
Central Supply and Maintenance	24.3	25.3	27.0	28.1
Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities	37.3	38.5	40.0	42.1
Administration and Associated Activities	6.7	6.9	5.9	6.3
Support of other Nations	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.1
Special Operations Forces	2.0	3.2	3.1	2.6
TOTAL	283.8	290.2	305.6	320.9

Airlift and Sealift are those forces that deploy the military to crisis areas and sustain those forces. The totals reflect the

procurement of additional airlift and sealift assets as well as the operations and maintenance of existing strategic mobility assets.

Guard and Reserve are those forces that represent the citizen soldiers of the United States. They form the total force, and are considered to be "essential partners" of the active forces.

Research and development refers to all research and development for new systems, but specifically excludes improvements to existing systems. This category includes the development, testing and evaluation of new systems.

Central Supply and Maintenance; Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities; and Administration and Associated Activities are overhead categories that support the total force. They perform essential functions associated with the daily operation of the military.

CONCLUSIONS.

This chapter has reviewed the literature on the strategic interests and objectives of the United States. It also examined the types of conflicts and the regions in which the nation has previously committed forces. Finally, this chapter presented an overview of the defense budget that has been allocated to provide for achieving our national security interests.

ENDNOTES

¹ National Security Strategy of the United States. The White House, 1990, p.15.

² The manner in which the United States and NATO waged the Cold War against the Soviet Union (and Warsaw Pact allies) is contained in a variety of NATO and general analytical documents. Representative document describing our Cold-War strategy is: Thomas H. Etzold. "The Strategic Environment of the Twenty-First Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planners." In Strategic Review, pp. 23-31, Vol 18 No 2, Spring 1990.

³ President Bush made numerous public pronouncements concerning his methodology for forcing Iraq to leave Kuwait and return the region to Status Quo. He discussed the use of political, economic and military options for accomplishing this goal. A representative speech was given on national television 8 August 1990 during which he discussed the drawing of "a line in the sand."

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, On War. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.

⁵ Colin L. Powell (General, CJCS), Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on Operation Desert Storm, 3 December 1990.

⁶ Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane. The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine." (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1988), p. 61.

⁷ Colin L. Powell (General, CJCS), Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on Operation Desert Storm, 3 December 1990.

⁸ Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane. The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine." (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1988), p. 61.

9 Colin L. Powell (General, CJCS), Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on Operation Desert Storm, 3 December 1990.

10 The "Spectrum of Conflict" depicted in Figure 4 is a composite from several sources and includes the definitions of low, mid and high intensity conflicts from Chapter 1. An original version of the spectrum of conflict is contained in an article entitled "Support for the Nation's Defense" by Lieutenant General Edward Honor, USA in Army Logistician, May-June 1989 (p. 2), and the characterization of conflicts comes from America's Small Wars by Collins. The figure was modified to facilitate discussion of the various types of conflicts.

11 United States Army Field Manual (FM) 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (SF, Rangers, CA, PSYOP, ARSOA) approved final draft, April 1991, p. 6.

12 Primary source of this information is the United States Army Field Manual (FM) 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (SF, Rangers, CA, PSYOP, ARSOA) approved final draft, p. 1-6, April 1991. However, Lieutenant Colonel John Parry, Command and General Staff Faculty provided figures which were incorporated into this figure by the thesis author. Thus, Figure 5 is a composite.

13 George Bush, "United States Defenses, Reshaping Our Forces," Lecture delivered at the Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 2 August 1990.

14 Colin L. Powell (General), "Is the Future What It Used To Be?," Lecture delivered at the Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, 8 November 1989.

15 Colin L. Powell (General), "Changes and Challenges." In Defense/90, May-June 1990, p. 8.

16 Ibid., p. 13.

17 Alfred M. Gray (General, USMC), "Planning for the Future: A Policy of Stability." In Strategic Review, United States Strategic Institute, Washington, D.C., Winter 1991, p.10.

18 Ibid., p. 11.

- 19 Carl E. Vuono (General, USA), "The Strategic Value of Conventional Forces." In Parameters, September 1990, p. 174.
- 20 Ibid., p. 176-177.
- 21 George B. Crist (General, USMC), "A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World." In Strategic Review, Winter 1990, p. 16.
- 22 Ibid., p. 17.
- 23 A Resource Guide of the Bicentennial of the Constitution, September 17, 1787-1987 (Washington, DC: Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army, 1987), A-5.
- 24 Ibid., A-5.
- 25 John McCain (Senator), "The Need for Strategy in the New Postwar Era." In Armed Forces Journal International, January 1990, p. 45.
- 26 Richard M. Nixon, "A War About Peace," Lecture delivered Republican Congressional Committee, New York, New York, 7 December 1990.
- 27 Thomas H. Etzold, "The Strategic Environment of the Twenty-First Century: Alternative Futures for Strategic Planners." In Strategic Review, Vol 18 No 2, Spring 1990, p.26.
- 28 "Living in a World of Multi-polar Power." In Asian Defence Journal, Vol 4, 1990, p.16.
- 29 Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams, The U.S. Army in a New Security Era. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1990, pp.62-63.
- 30 Ibid.

31 The Defense Planning Guidance depicts this 40 year trend of investing large amounts of the defense resources in programs designed to counter the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat. A representative example of this single focus can be seen in the Defense Planning Guidance for 1987.

32 DOD Budget: Comparison of Undated Five Year Plan with President's Budget (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990), p.6.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION.

This chapter will present the research design that will be followed in addressing the thesis topic. The research methodology to be utilized will incorporate several techniques including a literature review to gain background information, an analysis of trends using historical data and development of conclusions based on the trend analysis.

METHODOLOGY.

The research methodology for the conduct of this study is depicted in Figure 6. The methodology is a five step process designed to answer the synthesis questions presented in Chapter 1. Specifically,

- Is the United States spending its resources appropriately based on projected strategic interests and anticipated future requirements for military forces?
- What changes in this allocation will be required in the post-Cold War world?

STEP 1. LITERATURE REVIEW.

The literature review concerned four primary topics: United States national security strategy, an historical perspective on the commitment of forces, anticipated future threats and the defense budget. The results of this literature review were presented in Chapter 2.

The review of United States strategy was necessary to set the stage for determining where the nation will be going in the post-Cold War environment. It provided a perspective from which to begin examining the changes in the strategy that may evolve as the nation prepares for the 21st Century.

The historical perspective of the commitment of forces assisted in establishing where the United States has committed forces in the past. That is, it established in what regions of the world and to what type of conflicts has the United States applied the military element of power to accomplish its national security objectives. From this start point, it was possible to draw some conclusions concerning the future commitment of forces. This included conclusions concerning the regions in the world where the United States would be most likely to commit forces in the future as well as the types of conflicts that can be expected.

The future threats portion of the literature review provided insights into what the political and military leaders and their staffs consider to be the future threats to the United States' national security interests.

The examination of the budget assisted in determining how the defense budget is currently apportioned by broad mission category. This foundation formed the basis for recommendations and conclusions about the future defense spending based on changes in the national security requirements and the international strategic environment.




Figure 6. Research Methodology.

STEP 2. ANALYSIS.

This step involved examination of the anticipated future threats to the United States national security, and an analysis of the

historical commitment of forces. The intent of this step was to collect and consolidate information that would be valuable in the development of trends in Step 3.

The potential future threats to the nation were identified in this step. The methodology for this process included analysis of published literature, and the analysis of the historical commitment of forces. Specifically, this analysis dealt with the following question: How will/should the United States' strategic interests change in light of the evolving world situation?

These analyses provided insights into trends for future threats to United States' national security interests. From this step, specific statements along the following lines emerged:

- Region "X" will be of greater strategic importance.
- "Y" type of conflict (i.e., low, mid, high or nuclear warfare)

is the most likely to occur in the future.

STEP 3. MILITARY REQUIREMENT TRENDS.

The determination of potential threats to the United States national security interests in Step 2 suggested where the strategic interests of the nation will be challenged and the type of challenge that is to be expected. Based on this determination, trends for future threats emerged. These trends were analyzed in terms of the requirements for military forces.

The product that emerged from this step was key to the conclusions drawn throughout the remainder of the thesis. Solid statements grounded in a strong analytical foundation were required

as these future threat conclusions formed the basis for recommended spending adjustments.

STEP 4. COMPARISON.

The military requirements that emerged from step 3 were utilized to make judgments concerning the required increase or decrease in spending in the budget mission areas based on the anticipated threat and the applicability of that specific spending in the post-Cold War environment.

For example, using the statements from above, Region "X" will be of greater strategic importance and "Y" type of conflict is the most likely to occur in the future, one can compare the current spending trends to the anticipated requirements.

STEP 5. SYNTHESIS.

In this final step, the comparison from step 4 was utilized to make recommendations for spending adjustments. Figure 7 depicts the manner in which this information was displayed. It is important to note that the methodology for displaying the recommended spending adjustments was chosen to minimize comparisons between mission categories, and to focus on whether spending in a particular category should be increased, decreased or remain unchanged. Therefore, it is not possible to attempt to make absolute comparisons between the levels of spending in each of the mission areas.

MAJOR MISSIONS AND PROGRAMS	CURRENT	
	-	+
1. STRATEGIC FORCES		■
2. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES		■
3. INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS		■
4. AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT		■
5. GUARD AND RESERVE		■
6. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT		■
7. CENTRAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE		■
8. TRAINING, MEDICAL, AND OTHER GENERAL PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES		■
9. ADMINISTRATION AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORT		■
10. SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS		■
11. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES		■

Figure 7. Mission Category Spending Conclusions Format.

For each of the mission categories listed, a square which will depicts the recommendation for increasing, decreasing or leaving that mission category as it is currently funded. This recommendation was based on the anticipated threats to United States' national interests, areas in which United States forces can expect to be deployed and the types of conflicts that the nation can expect to participate in through approximately 2010.

The specific questions that were evaluated are listed below:

- Is the United States spending its resources appropriately based on projected strategic interests and anticipated future requirements for military forces?

- What changes in this allocation will be required in the post-Cold War world?

CONCLUSIONS.

This chapter has presented the analytical framework which will be utilized in addressing the thesis question. The research methodology will incorporate several techniques including a literature review to gain background information, an analysis of trends using historical data and development of conclusions based on the trend analysis.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION.

This chapter will present an analysis of the following:

- Future national strategic interests and objectives,
- Trends for the employment of forces,
- Threat trends that are emerging in this post-Cold World era,
- The force requirements that will be required to combat

these threats, and

- Necessary adjustments to the defense budget in light of changes in the international security landscape.

It is important to remember that this thesis is considering the period from the present to approximately 2010. Therefore, analysis and conclusions presented in this chapter will focus primarily on this 20 year period.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES.

The national strategic interests and objectives of the United States are closely tied to our national heritage. Our national strategy, which is manifested in our interests and objectives, is derived

directly from the founding fathers and is documented in the Constitution of the United States. In writing the Constitution, the intent was to establish the framework for our nation such that individuals had certain guaranteed rights, securities and freedoms. The preamble to the Constitution clearly establishes this intent. It states,

We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our property, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.¹

It follows then that this preamble then becomes the single most important statement to our Republic. It provides a *raison d'etre* for our government and a template for assessing the government's actions. All actions taken by the government should be able to be linked back to this statement of purpose, and only those proposed actions that satisfy the intent of this preamble should be implemented. Of course, this is an idealistic approach that in practice becomes much more difficult to implement.

The purpose of this discussion is to clearly establish that the national security policy of the United States is evolutionary. The fact that our system of government, including the Constitution, stems from a revolution rather than an evolution is noteworthy. However, since the signing of the Constitution in September 1787, the national security policy of our nation has evolved to its current state.

As evidence of this 200 year evolutionary process, consider the following. In the March 1990 version of National Security Strategy of the United States authored by the The White House, an objective is "The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure."² Clearly, the preamble to the Constitution establishes this as a requirement. Further evidence that our national security strategy evolves is presented in the opening paragraph of this 1990 strategy document in which President Bush writes the following,

Throughout our history, our national security strategy has pursued broad, consistent goals. We have always sought to protect the safety of the nation, its citizens, and its way of life. We have also worked to advance the welfare of our people by contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom, and progress within which our democracy - and other free nations - can flourish.

These broad goals have guided American foreign and defense policy throughout the life of the Republic. They were so much the driving force behind President Jefferson's decision to send the American Navy against the Pasha of Tripoli in 1804 as they were when President Reagan directed American naval and air forces to return to that area in 1986. They animated Woodrow Wilson's Points, and my initiatives in support of democracy in Eastern Europe this past year.³

While the stated national security interests of the United States are not likely to change drastically from year to year or even during the 20 year period under consideration, the manner in which the nation pursues these interests can conceivably be altered. For example, pre-World War II, the United States pursued an isolationist

strategy.⁴ The hope was that the country could avoid becoming entangled in world affairs. Instead of participating in events and potentially influencing the outcome, the United States choose to view the mounting tensions from the sidelines. The end result was that the United States was eventually drawn into a World War on someone else's terms rather than by its own choosing. A lesson that the nation learned from this experience is that inaction and indifference is not necessarily a recipe for remaining neutral or staying out of an altercation.

The United States emerged from World War II as a superpower in every sense of the word. We possessed the political, economic, social and military power that defines this term. Furthermore, in the post-World War II environment, the United States assumed the role of the champion of freedom and democratic values worldwide. Since 1945, the United States has been a world power engaging in what some might call internationalism or globalism. However, this internationalism or globalism amounts to nothing more than the United States fulfilling its post-World War II responsibilities. The United States' role in the development of and participation in the United Nations and NATO are examples of how we have fulfilled this responsibility.

Recently, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with the accompanying reduction in East-West tensions coupled with increased interest in domestic problems has prompted some to call for a return to a more isolationist posture. Examination of the pre-World War II scenario discussed above provides evidence of why this is not the

best way for the United States to achieve its national security interests.

If the United States were to return to an isolationist strategy, we would lose the ability to influence international actors on issues. By not being involved in world politics, we would leave a power vacuum which would invariably be filled by some other actor or actors. These other forces would not necessarily resolve issues in a manner favorable to United States interests. More simply stated, isolationism essentially would prevent the nation from playing an active role in world politics and makes the nation a passenger rather than a driver in the process.

Increased economic interdependence is another reason why reverting to an isolationist strategy is not a viable alternative for the United States. While we are a wealthy nation in terms of our natural resources, we are certainly not self-sufficient. We rely on a number of nations for our resources as well as markets for our goods. Furthermore, heavy international investment in the United States would complicate any isolationist posture we pursued. Many of our corporations are truly international and attempts to move to a United States first strategy would no doubt cause concern and could potentially elicit some undesirable reactions from our allies.

Retrenchment to an isolationist policy would also present a moral dilemma to the United States. Many nations are heavily dependent on the United States for security, political support and economic aid. Since, their policies have been established based on continued involvement in their affairs by the United States, a rapid withdrawal from these commitments could have dire implications for

these countries. Examination of previously pro-Soviet satellite nations which recently saw power vacuums created as a result of the Soviet demise are examples of the potential impact of withdrawing from the affairs of a nation or region rapidly. Additionally, if the United States did turn to an isolationist policy, the nations that were "abandoned" would be reluctant to trust the United States if we were ever to decide to reverse this isolationist trend.

While a return to isolationism could potentially have some short term benefits for the United States economy and in other domestic areas, the long term costs are likely to be severe. The loss of influence would degrade the ability of the United States to interact on issues that began as national problems but became international problems. An example of this situation is the Chernybol nuclear accident. While this started as a Soviet problem, all of the world must be concerned about the long term impact on the environment.

A final argument for the United States practicing an international or globalist strategy concerns our obligation to the world to fulfill our superpower status. Failing to do so would create a serious power vacuum as was alluded to above. Even international institutions such as the United Nations would be significantly impacted by the United States' turning to an isolationist policy. The world has recently had a lesson in the potential problems associated with the abandonment of a nation or region by a superpower. The destabilizing effects on the Persian Gulf region which led to a high intensity war is an example of what can happen in the absence of a moderating influence. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait can be linked to the absence of the Soviet Union's influence in the region. The

version of the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Strategic Survey 1990-1991 summarizes the general worldwide situation created by the virtual elimination of East-West tensions as follows,

With the end of US-Soviet geopolitical competition there was an expectation that peace in general had broken out. But of course regional conflict had its own roots and logic which East-West confrontation might at times have exacerbated, at other times limited and contained, but did not necessarily cause. The end of the contest between the superpowers only revealed further local tensions around the world, not least with the Soviet European empire, too long repressed by the rigidities of the Cold War. The frigid arguments of geopolitics were quickly replaced by the passions of old unsolved problems: the vengeance of nations; the reassertions of religious faith; the nostalgia for traditional ways of life crushed by incomplete and unsuccessful modernization; and the cry for new forms of political and economic independence.⁵

While some have suggested that the United States return to a more isolationist strategy, it is doubtful that this move would occur. The growing interdependence among nations of the world makes this move both impractical and improbable for the United States.

Furthermore, the evolutionary nature of our national security strategy makes any major alterations from our current strategy unlikely as well. This is not to imply that the next 20 years will be identical to the previous 45 years which have been dominated by East-West tensions. However, the underlying national goals and objectives will not change drastically during this upcoming period.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMITMENT OF MILITARY FORCES.

An examination of the types of conflicts that the United States has committed forces to in the past can be helpful in determining where the country will be likely to commit forces in the future and for what causes.

In examining the data, several key points became obvious (See Appendix A for the complete data set.). First, the data only includes events that deviate from normal peacetime competition. The daily actions of United States forces are not captured in the data. For example, while special operations forces are involved daily in activities such as security assistance and training of militaries worldwide, these activities are not captured in the data. The same is true for conventional and nuclear forces where the daily deterrence value and missions of these units are not captured.

Secondly, there are vast differences in the magnitude and length of conflicts that are listed in the data set. For example, the counter-insurgency operations in which the United States participated in the Philippines from 1899 to 1913 is reflected as only a one line entry in the data while the two hour raid over Libya in 1986 has a similar one line entry. Additionally, the evacuation of Liberia and the recent Gulf War are depicted in a similar manner; the only difference that distinguishes these actions is that Liberia is categorized as a low intensity conflict while the Gulf War is considered high intensity.

Finally, the data reflects a significant change in the post-World War II era in the United States' commitment of military forces. Pre-World War II, the United States was involved primarily in security

operations which involved the deployment of small units to secure United States property or citizens on foreign nations' soil. Of the 49 incidents from 1900 to 1941, 40 can be characterized as security operations. This reflects the United States' foreign policy strategy of the time and is due in large measure to the posture of the nation. It is important to remember that the United States entered World War II as a second rate power and emerged as a superpower with significant political, economic and military might.

This final point is most critical to the interpretation of the data. The transformation that the United States underwent from 1941 to 1945 cannot be understated or ignored. It dramatically altered the manner in which the country conducted foreign policy and perhaps more importantly our role in the international arena. The United States became a world power that could not simply withdraw to our homeland and ignore the rest of the world. Since World War II, the United States has been at the forefront of international politics; this reflected a fundamental change for our nation. While events leading up to World War II are important to the nation's history and ideological make-up, World War II changed the course of United States' interaction in the world. Furthermore, the world that emerged from World War II was fundamentally different. It had become polarized (with competition between the Allies, particularly with the Soviets), and the nuclear age had begun. For this reason, the data to be examined during the remainder of this analysis will be limited to post-1945. The data for events prior to this period tends to skew the analysis and leads to questionable conclusions.

Furthermore, when analyzing the data concerning the commitment of United States forces, it is worthwhile to divide the timeframe from 1945 to the present into discrete periods. The three periods are: 1) Post-World War II to Pre-Vietnam War, 2) Vietnam War to 1980, and 3) 1980 to the Present. Each of the endpoints of the periods represent a remarkable event in United States history. The significance of the post-World War II era has already been addressed above. The period leading up to the beginning of the Vietnam War marked a period where the United States and our allies became overtly concerned with the spread of Communism. The United States had a great willingness to meet and defeat any perceived Communist threat. The Vietnam War altered this interventionist ideal and caused the United States to reexamine the manner and purposes for which we would commit forces. The Nixon Doctrine, which stated that we would supply arms and assistance to nations threatened by aggression if they would assume the responsibility for providing the manpower, was a manifestation of this policy. The United States had become apprehensive about the perception that we were fighting the wars of other nations. Finally, 1980 corresponds to the Desert One debacle in which a joint force failed in its attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran. This failure certainly can be counted as one of the low points in our military's history as well as our foreign policy of the United States.

Table 4 depicts the intensity of conflicts by period from 1945 to the Present. Two important trends can be identified in the data set. The number of conflicts per year is rising, and the intensity of the conflicts is increasing.

In viewing the data, it is worth noting that the characterization of an action or conflict focused on the type of forces the United States committed to the conflicts. The data did not attempt to capture the type of forces committed by the adversary or the manner in which the adversary viewed the conflict. Secondly, the level of resistance was not utilized in the characterization process.

There are two other points worth noting. First, the role of the United States forces is not captured in the data set. Detailed explanations of force commitments are contained in the source documents. Also, the duration of the conflicts is not captured in Table 4, although it is presented in Appendix A.

Table 4. Intensity of Conflicts.

Timeframe	Low Intensity	Mid Intensity	High Intensity	Total
Post-WWII (1945) to Pre Vietnam War (1964) (19 yrs)	14	2	0	16
Vietnam War (1964) to 1980 (16 yrs)	9	2	0	11
1980 to Present (11 yrs)	21	4	1	26
Total	44	8	1	53

In the first period, the number of conflicts per year was .84 (i.e., 16 total conflicts over a 19 year period, or $16/19=.84$). This corresponds to the United States committing forces over three times in a four year period. During the second period, the United States' growing apprehension, as a result of the perceived unsuccessful use

of force in Vietnam, can be credited with a moderate reduction to .69 conflicts per year. This represents approximately a 18 percent reduction in the use of military force from period one to period two. In fact, during these two periods combined, the military was utilized in only 27 conflicts. That is, the military was only used 27 times in a 35 year period. In contrast, the 11 year period from 1980 to the Present saw 26 instances where the United States reverted to the use of force. This amounts to 2.4 conflicts per year, or a 348 percent ($2.4/.69 \times 100$) increase over period two.

A graphical portrayal of the increase in the number of conflicts is depicted in Figure 8. This figure also provides a good depiction of the increasing violence associated with today's conflicts. The number of high and mid intensity conflicts is to be increasing as well. In the two periods prior there were a total of four mid intensity conflicts over the 35 year timeframe. In the third 11 year period, there were four mid and one high intensity conflicts.

Looking at the measure of conflicts per year, one sees that the number of mid and high intensity conflicts in periods one and two is $4/35$ or .11 per year. For period three, this measure is $5/11$ or .45 per year. This amounts to approximately one mid or high intensity conflicts every two years.




Figure 8. Intensity of Conflicts by Period.

Another important characteristic of conflicts is the type. There are seven categories of conflicts: Insurgency, Resistance; Coups d'Etat; Counter Insurgency; Combatting Terrorism; Security Operations; Conventional Operations; and Noncombat Operations. Table 5 depicts the frequency of each type of conflict by period.

A note concerning the data is necessary. In classifying conflicts, few can simply be narrowed down to a single type. However, in this analysis, only one "type" per conflict was identified to simplify the analysis. For example, the bombing of Libya in 1986 was in a large measure a response to terrorist actions. However, this conflict was characterized as a conventional operation due to the

manner in which it was executed and because the "terrorism" was state sponsored (i.e., Libya).

The United States has most frequently been involved in conventional operations over the timeframe from 1945 to the present. Of the 53 total conflicts, 34 or over 64 percent have been conventional operations. These range from wars such as Korea and Desert Storm to raids such as the bombing of Libya in 1986. The next two most common types of conflicts that United States forces have been committed to are noncombat operations (9) and security operations (5). Noncombat operations include such conflicts as the the peacekeeping duties in the Sinai that began in 1982. It is worth noting that events such as the evacuation of Vietnam in 1975 were characterized as conventional operations due to the manner in which they were conducted and the types of forces that were employed. The protection of the reflagged tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 is a good example of security operations. The remainder of the categories considered accounted for approximately 10 percent of the conflicts during this period.

An interesting trend during the period from the Vietnam War to 1980 was the lack of any other type of conflict except for conventional operations. All 11 conflicts were characterized as conventional operations. This reflects United States reluctance to become involved with the affairs of other nations during this timeframe as a result of the Vietnam experience. All of the conflicts during this period were oriented on United States objectives rather than on international objectives. An example of the types of incidents in which the United States became involved was the 1976

incident in Korea where a United States officer was murdered at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This act prompted an increase in readiness posture and a deployment of a contingency package as a show of force. Comparing periods one and three indicates that the nation has returned to post-Vietnam employment of forces, and has move past the reluctance to use forces in support of other nations. In periods one and three, conventional operations accounted for only 50 and 58 percent of the total conflicts, respectively.

Table 5. Types of Conflicts.

Timeframe	Type Conflict						
	IR	Cd'E	CI	SE	CT	CO	NO
Post-WWII (1945) to Pre Vietnam War (1964) (19 yrs)	0	1	1	3	0	8	3
Vietnam War (1964) to 1980 (16 yrs)	0	0	0	0	0	11	0
1980 to Present (11 yrs)	1	0	1	2	1	15	6
Total	1	1	2	5	1	34	9

IR - Insurgency, Resistance
 CI - Counter Insurgency
 SE - Security Operations
 NO - Noncombat Operations

Cd'E - Coups d'Etat
 CT - Combatting Terrorism
 CO - Conventional Operations

Another important aspect to consider about the historical commitment of United States forces is the region to which they were deployed. This data has been summarized in Table 6. In the first period (post-World War II to pre-Vietnam War), there are three of eight regions of the world where the United States did not commit

forces in a conflict. Also, United States forces were not used in a global conflict during this period either. This is not meant to imply that the forces were not present in the particular regions, only that no out of the ordinary deployments of forces occurred. The four categories are North America, Central America, South America and in a global context. East Asia was the region that saw the most United States intervention with a total of eight occurrences: China (three), Korea, Taiwan (Formosa), Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. Most of these conflicts were related to halting the spread of Communism in the region or protecting United States interests from falling into Communist hands. The Middle East hosted three conflicts, while Europe and Caribbean hosted two conflicts. Interdiction in Africa remained minimal with one occurrence.

In the second period (Vietnam War to 1980), the trends concerning the regions continued. The same lack of intervention in the four regions is present. Furthermore, most intervention occurred in the East Asia region, and all of the intervention in these conflicts was related to Communism.

Period three (1980 to the Present) saw significant modifications to the regions where forces were deployed. First, the number of regions where United States forces intervened increased to include all regions except North America. There was even a conflict of a global nature - the ongoing Narco conflict that began in 1986. Secondly, intervention in East Asia was greatly reduced which altered trends established in the earlier two periods.

South America saw an increase from no interventions in the first two periods to three interventions in period three. However,

most of the conflicts in this region (two of the three) were related to drug initiatives.

Central America was another trouble spot which saw no conflicts in the first two periods, but saw a total of five conflicts in the third period. Of note was the fact that these five conflicts occurred in four different countries: El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama (2). However, the conflict in Honduras was actually an effort to counter Nicaraguan aggression. Perhaps the most notable of these conflicts was Operation Just Cause in which the United States used a force of 24,000 soldiers to remove a dictator, Manuel Noriega, from office and assist in the standing up of a new government based on the results of a free election. Also of note in this region is the ongoing nature of conflicts. For example, the problems with Nicaragua have been brewing since 1981. Likewise the situation had been getting progressively worse in Panama 1988, and reached a culminating point with Operation Just Cause. Overall, the trouble in this region can be traced to two fundamental causes: Communism and dictatorships.

Europe and the Caribbean remained relatively calm during this period. There were only two incidents. The European incident stemmed from the Achille Lauro hijacking. It involved Arab hijackers that had commandeered an Egyptian Airliner which was forced to land by United States Navy aircraft. The incident which occurred in the Caribbean was the invasion of Grenada in 1983 during Operation Urgent Fury.

Africa also saw an increase in the number of conflicts in which the United States committed forces. For the 35 years preceding

period three, the number of interventions was only three; however, in the 11 year period that followed there were six conflicts. Three of these conflicts involved Libya which became a belligerent state supporting terrorism during this period. The other three conflicts were Chad in 1983, Liberia in 1990 and Somalia in 1990. The conflict in Chad involved the deployment of aircraft to support them in their struggle against Libya. In Liberia and Somalia, Marines secured the embassy and evacuated personnel from these war ravaged countries.

The Middle East saw quite a lot of United States interest during this third period. In fact, this became the most prolific area for the commitment of United States forces. The period began with the failed rescue of hostages held at the United States embassy in Tehran. There were also peacekeeping operations in two areas: Sinai and Lebanon. However, the source of the majority of the conflicts was the Persian Gulf which saw a total of three conflicts including the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging operations and Operations Desert Shield and Storm which checked aggression by Iraq, and noncombat operations in Turkey in 1991. The conflicts in the region can be linked to two basic factors: the reemergence of fundamentalism and dictatorships.⁶

East Asia which had been the region which historically had received the most United States intervention saw only a single conflict in the third period. This is in contrast to periods one and two where United States forces were utilized seven and six times, respectively. The single incident occurred in the Philippines when

the President ordered Marines to secure the embassy and naval aircraft to support pro-government forces against a coup.

Table 6. Regions of Conflict.

Timeframe	Region of Conflict								
	NA	CA	SA	CN	EU	AF	ME	EA	GL
Post-WWII (1945) to Pre Vietnam War (1964) (19 yrs)	0	0	0	2	2	1	3	8	0
Vietnam War (1964) to 1980 (16 yrs)	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	6	0
1980 to Present (11 yrs)	0	5	3	1	1	6	8	1	1
Total	0	5	3	4	4	9	12	15	1

NA - North America

SA - South America

EU - Europe

ME - Middle East

GL - Global

CA - Central America

CN - Caribbean

AF - Africa

EA - East Asia

The data clearly articulates several trends concerning the use of military force. These trends suggest the following conclusions:

- The United States' propensity towards the use of force is increasing.
- The intensity of conflicts is increasing.
- The United States tends to utilize its forces in the following priority: conventional operations, noncombat operations, security operations, and others. Most uses of military force can be traced to the direct threatening of United States personnel or property.

- Perceived unsuccessful intervention in international affairs such as the Vietnam War tends to dampen United States' international intervention, whereas successful use of force such as Grenada (1983), Libya (1986) and Southwest Asia (1990-1991) tends to reinforce United States' interventionist policies.

- Communism has been replaced by dictatorships, fundamentalism, terrorism and economics as forces for causing conflicts.

- An overall trend that emerges is that countries or areas that have a series of interventions usually have a "final," violent invasion, intervention or attack by the United States as an end to this series. This trend has become more prevalent in the third period as evidence by actions in Libya (1981, 1983 (Chad), 1986, 1989) and Panama (1988, 1989). Also, the United States' overwhelming military might, including the threat of nuclear engagement, does not appear to dampen belligerent states' attitudes. Only the actual use of force causes an end or at least a lessening of overt hostility to the United States.

- The move to the diversification of regions for the employment of forces (i.e., only five regions in periods one and two, but seven regions in period three) coupled with the increased number of conflicts will complicate the ability of the United States to respond.

- 36 of the 48 conflicts (note that the global narco conflict was not considered) or 75 percent are in regions that are 4000 nautical miles (NM) or greater away from the United States. Few conflicts

are directly in the United States' backyard in the Northern Hemisphere.

FUTURE THREATS.

The preceding section on the historical perspective on the commitment of forces has been important to establishing where the United States been since 1945. While it is not possible to directly extrapolate and predict what could cause the United States to commit forces in the future, analysis of previous commitments can provide some insights. This section will present analysis of four aspects of future threats to national security: (1) Potential United States interests endangered, (2) Likely intensity of future threats, (3) Type of threat or conflict, and (4) Likely region of conflict.

Interests Endangered

Historical analysis provides a depiction of the interests that the United States has committed forces to in the past in support of our national security interests. However, the answer to the question of what interests are likely to cause the country to commit forces in the future is not easy to answer. Examination of the data revealed the extent to which commitment of forces was linked to containment or the halting of the spread of Communism. With the virtual end of the spread of Communism and the breakup of much of the Communist bloc, it appears that much of our motivation for committing forces has been eliminated. However, three recent examples of the commitment of forces provide insight into potential future

Panama and Southwest Asia. Each of these conflicts are examined below.

In the case of Libya, the United States committed forces on two occasions (1981, 1983 (Chad)) prior to the bombing raid in 1986. The tensions between the United States and Libya can be traced to Libya's support for terrorist organizations and threats to American citizens and property.⁷ In addition, Libya was developing weapons of mass destruction that could be destabilizing and present a threat to United States interests in the region. Furthermore, Libya's leader, Muammar Qaddafi, was a strong and brutal dictator involved in anti-democratic actions within his country. This clearly went against the United States' declared interest of promoting the spread of democracy and freedom throughout the world.

Panama (1988, 1989) represented a similar case. Noriega was an anti-democratic dictator. During his reign, he stripped much of the wealth from Panama. He was actively involved in drug trafficking and his actions were rapidly become more anti-American. His regime both threatened and carried out attacks on United States personnel and property.

The United States' intervention in Southwest Asia also provides some interesting insights into the motivation for committing forces. In this case, the tensions rose very quickly in contrast to the situations in Panama and Libya. When the small republic of Kuwait was invaded and occupied by Iraqi forces, the United States, as head of the Allied coalition, stepped in to protect Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression and finally to restore Kuwait's "legitimate" government to power. What is of note about this situation is that the

United States supported a return to power of a monarchy. While United States personnel and property were threatened during the invasion when the embassy was surrounded, there was never a direct threat made towards the United States. So why did the Iraqi invasion illicit such a strong response from the United States? The simple answer is that the economic realities associated with allowing a belligerent nation to control such a large proportion of the world's oil reserves were daunting. President Bush summarized the rationale for our intervention best when he states,

The stakes are high. Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military power in the world. Our country now imports nearly half of the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence.⁸

Looking at these three examples together yields some interesting conclusions. Table 7 provides a synopsis of the rationale for the United States committing forces in these three countries. An attempt has been made to subjectively assess the degree to which each rationale contributed to the decision to commit forces. There are some interesting trends that surface through this comparison.

Table 7. Rationale for the Commitment of Forces.

Rationale	Libya	Panama	Southwest Asia
Primary	US personnel and property threatened by terrorism	US personnel and property threatened	Economics associated with oil distribution if Iraqi invasion allowed to stand and Destabilization of region
Secondary	Weapons development program - primarily mass destruction weapons	Drug Trafficking connections	Weapons development program - primarily mass destruction weapons
Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-American and anti-democratic sentiments • Dictator controlled country • Pro-Soviet position 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-American and anti-democratic sentiments • Dictator controlled country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-American and anti-democratic sentiments • Dictator controlled country

Threats to personnel and property were the primary rationale that motivated the nation to respond with military force in these cases. In fact, looking at the complete data set reveals that this trend has been prevalent throughout our recent history. That is, usually the United States tends to respond after multiple threats or actions against its personnel and property. A single act is typically not sufficient to gain a United States response. This was the case in Libya and Panama.

As the President's statement indicates, a primary cause for the United States intervention in Southwest Asia was economics. There have been various acts of aggression throughout the world since 1945. However, the United States has not chosen to become involved in them due to the lack of significant impact on the United States.

For example, consider the strife in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia or the between India and Pakistan. While these conflicts are regrettable and the United States has an interest in the outcome, the interests are not sufficient to warrant the direct application of United States military power.

The secondary rationale for intervention was also motivated by the test of whether a nation's actions can impact or could impact in the future directly on the United States. Clearly, both the development of weapons of mass destruction by nations that have anti-American and anti-democratic leanings, and drug trafficking have the potential to impact directly on the United States. Combatting the spread of weapons of mass destruction was a contributing factor in the use of force in Libya and Southwest Asia, while combatting drug trafficking was a contributing factor in the Panama intervention.

While much has been made of the United States' desire to promote human rights, political and economic freedom, and the spread of democratic institutions worldwide, it appears that these desires alone are not sufficient to cause intervention. It can be concluded that a more direct and tangible impact on the United States must be present for the direct application of the military in a conflict.

It is worth noting that in each of these conflicts, the actions took place against a country with a dictator in power. So while it may be too strong to say that the desire to instill a democratic regime motivated United States' intervention, it certainly does

appear that there is a natural antagonism between the United States and countries with dictators.

Intensity of Conflict

The discussion concerning the intensity of conflicts above provides a good depiction of the increasing violence associated with today's conflicts. There is a proliferation of all types of weaponry from sophisticated small arms to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. The end result is that the world is becoming inherently more dangerous.

Virtually all nations of the world either have or are attempting to gain the ability to acquire, and in some cases produce, these advanced weapon systems. Economic interdependence and the proliferation of technology share primary responsibility for the spread of arms. Certainly, it is not in our interest to stifle economic growth (and the sharing of technologies that accompanies it) simply to avert the spread of arms. Even if the United States attempted to reduce the flow of technology out of our borders, it is doubtful that these efforts would accomplish their desired objectives. There are many other sources of weapons available to those who have the means.

Nations such as South Africa and Israel, that seem to have an insatiable desire for weapons, have developed their own weapons production facilities. South Africa and Israel have become large exporters of weapons worldwide, although Israel has tended in the past to produce weapons more for their own consumption. Other major exporters of arms include the United States, the Soviet Union,

China, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Germany. In addition the other members of NATO and the old Warsaw Pact, Brazil, Argentina, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan Iran, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, both Koreas, Vietnam and Japan all have strong export programs.⁹

Arms control has further complicated the ability to control the proliferation of weapons. The recent Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE) agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact which limited the number of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, aircraft and helicopters in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region saw the removal of perhaps 100,000 pieces of treaty limited equipment from the area of application. This does not include the other types of equipment, not limited by the treaty, which comprised units that are disbanding as a result of the agreement. While the agreement called for destruction of treaty limited equipment, many weapons were removed from the region prior to the signing of the treaty and have thus escaped the letter of the agreement. What will become of this equipment? Obviously, it has the potential for being marketed throughout the world. This quantity of heavy, armored equipment spread worldwide has significant implications for nations that have the propensity for intervention as the United States does.

There is a great worldwide demand for military equipment of all types. Thus, weapons are exported to a variety of destinations. As evidence of the growing demand for weapons and the diversity of destinations, consider the following. From 1961 to 1978, the total export to the third world went from \$1411 to \$9363 million. The arms were exported to the following regions: Middle East (\$4312

million), Africa (\$1986 million), Far East (\$1402 million), South and Central America (\$932 million) and South Asia (\$641 million).

The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union has created an even more alarming possibility concerning the proliferation of weapons. The technicians and scientists from these countries have services and talents that are no longer in great demand in their own countries. However, these people are in great demand in the third world. This condition has particularly devastating implications for the spread of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and the means to deliver these devices. For example, consider how the Gulf War might have been impacted by Iraq having the technology and delivery means to engage coalition forces with these sorts of high technology weapons rather than antiquated SCUD missiles. Israel surely would have been more threatened and the relative precision with which the Allied attack was executed could have been greatly diminished depending on the manner in which these weapons would have been employed.

Table 8 provides an example of the proliferation of conventional weapons in the third world. The holdings in selected ground systems, combat aircraft and naval vessels for Libya, Syria and Nicaragua for the periods 1970-71, 1980-81 and 1990-91 are provided. This data demonstrates the massive buildup that has occurred over this 20 year period in these three countries. Note also that the three nations are on three different continents.

What is of the most concern is that these buildups are not out of the ordinary. This situation is occurring throughout the world. A

necessary question that must be asked is, what does this buildup mean to the United States? Very simply, it can be concluded that there are very few nations in the world in which the United States could hope to have overwhelming combat power with purely a light force. The days of small arms conflicts appear to be coming to a close as the proliferation of conventional weapons continues. Even nations where armored forces have historically not been employed such as Nicaragua now have some armored capability which would pose problems for a light or airborne force.

Another impact of this trend can be seen in the Table 4, Intensity of Conflicts, which provided data to support the increased intensity (and violence) associated with more recent conflicts. It stands to reason that as weapons proliferation trends continue, the intensity of the conflicts the United States becomes involved in will also increase.

It is also worth reiterating that the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the technology to produce these weapons continues at an alarming rate. Evidence of this trend was presented graphically in Chapter 2 in Table 2, Technology Proliferation - 1999. This further complicates the process of deploying and supporting a force in future conflicts as forces will require protective overgarments and other equipment to allow freedom of operation on this sort of battlefield.

Table 8. Proliferation of Conventional Weapons in the Third World.

Country	System	1970-71	1980-81	1990-91
Libya	Ground- Tanks	6 Centurions	2400 Total (T-54/55/62/72)	2000 (T-54/55/62/72)
	ACV	140	1890	1930
	Artillery	?	1300	1790
	Aircraft (Combat)	7 F-5s	287 Total • MiG 21/23/25 • TU-22 • C-130 • Helicopters	531 Total • Mirage • MiG 21/23/25 • C-130 • Helicopters
	Naval Vessels	• 1 Corvette • 15 Patrol Boats	• 1 Corvette • 25 Patrol Boats • 3 Ex-Soviet Subs • 1 Frigate • 1 Amphib • 1 Minesweeper	• 1 Corvette • 55 Patrol Boats • 6 Ex-Soviet Subs • 3 Frigate • 5 Amphib • 8 Minesweeper
Syria	Ground- Tanks	880	2920 Total • 2200 T-54/55 • 600 T-62 • 120 T-72	4050 Total • 2100 T-54/55 • 1000 T-62 • 950 T-72
	ACV	700+	1600+	4300+
	Artillery	?	800+	2400+
	Aircraft (Combat)	210 Total • 80 MiG-15/17 • 40 SU-7 • 90 MiG-21 • Transports & Helicopters	395 Total • 60 MiG-17 • 200 MiG-21 • 60 MiG-23 • 25 MiG-25 • Transports & Helicopters	499 Total • 172 MiG-21 • 80 MiG-23 • 35 MiG-25 • 60 MiG-29 • 110 Helicopters • Transports
	Naval Vessels	• 15 Torpedo Boat • 3 Coastal Patrol • 10 Patrol w/SSM • 2 Minesweepers	• 15 Torpedo Boat • 9 Coastal Patrol • 18 Patrol w/SSM • 3 Minesweepers • 2 Ex-Soviet Petya Frigate	• 15 Torpedo Boat • 9 Coastal Patrol • 18 Patrol w/SSM • 3 Minesweepers • 2 Ex-Soviet Petya Frigate • 3 Ex-Soviet Romeo Subs
Nicaragua	Ground- Tanks	-	2 M-4 Medium Tanks	130 T-54/55 22 PT-76
	ACV	-	48	186
	Artillery	?	24	800
	Aircraft (Combat)	12	• 16 Aircraft • 10 Helicopters	• 16 Aircraft • 10 Helicopters
	Naval Vessels	• 6 Coastal Patrol • Other Small Patrol	• 10 Coast Patrol • Other Patrol • 1 Landing Craft	• 18 Patrol & Coast Combatants • 8 Minesweepers

- Notes:
1. ACV (Armored Combat Vehicles) - Includes Recce, AIFV (Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles) and APC (Armored Personnel Carriers).
 2. Artillery includes mortars, towed howitzers, self-propelled, howitzers and multiple Rocket Launchers.
 3. All helicopters listed are armed.

Type of Conflict

In the section of this chapter concerning the historical analysis of the types of conflicts, seven categories were identified: Insurgency, Resistance; Coups d'Etat; Counter Insurgency; Combatting Terrorism; Security Operations; Conventional Operations; and Noncombat Operations. These categories will be examined to assess the likelihood that in the future United States forces will be committed to these types of conflicts.

Only five times since 1900 has the United States committed forces to an insurgency or resistance. Three of these occurrences were during World War II and were actually against either German or Japanese occupation forces. The only other times that the United States has committed forces to an insurgency is in Cuba (in the 1960s) and in Nicaragua (1981). Note that both of these non-World War II commitments were in the Northern Hemisphere and were not successful. The United States has shown a strong reluctance to become involved in these sorts of national civil wars. Certainly, there have been plenty of opportunities, however the United States has preferred to stay out of direct contact during these conflicts. It is more likely that the United States would utilize security assistance to fund insurgents that we supported rather than to commit United States personnel. The Nixon Doctrine is an affirmation of this desire to stay out of other nations' battles while only lending support in the

form of equipment and training. It is not impossible, but it is very unlikely that the United States would involve itself directly in an insurgency conflict. However, if we were to become involved in an insurgency conflict then it would almost unquestionably occur in our hemisphere.

An example of the United States' reluctance to become involved in the internal affairs of other nations can be seen in our handling of the situation in Yugoslavia. The United States is certainly interested and has a stake in the outcome (i.e., desire to see stability in the region). However, we are distancing ourselves from the process of getting to the final disposition. Our interests are not sufficient to warrant the use or threatened use of force to deter aggression and influence the outcome. Nor do we have any expectation that the use or threatened use of force would impact upon the final outcome. As a result, we are remaining relatively quiet on the issue.

The commitment of forces in support of a coup d'etat is perhaps the most unlikely use of our military forces. Only once since 1900 (Cuba in the 1960s) has the United States attempted to use our forces to support this type of operation, and it was unsuccessful. The use of our military forces in this manner would create a morale dilemma for the nation; it would result in the overthrow of a "legitimate" government. It is foreseeable that only in conjunction with another type of conflict would a coup d'etat be utilized. An example of this is in Panama during Operation Just Cause when United States forces were used to unseat the incumbent dictatorial regime based on the results of a free election. To justify the action, the elected regime was sworn in to office hours before the invasion

occurred. As a result, the Panama invasion was classified as a conventional operation rather than a coup d'etat. However, it is difficult to postulate a set of circumstances whereby the United States would conduct an isolated coup d'etat.

Counterinsurgency is another type of conflict where the United States has shown reluctance in the past to commit forces. Since 1900, there have only been four instances where the United States has committed forces in a counterinsurgency: Philippines (1899-1913), Laos (1962-1975), Zaire (1960-1964) and El Salvador (1981). The United States has met with limited success in these conflicts, having only achieved the desired outcome in one of the four conflicts (Philippines). There is no reason to believe that this trend would be reversed in future counterinsurgency operations.

Insurgencies, coup d'etat and counterinsurgencies are actions that tend to have several other characteristics that make them undesirable to the United States for committing forces. First, these types of conflicts generally drag out over a long period of time. As we are not a patient nation, we tend to lose interest in conflicts that seem to go on indefinitely. It is not an understatement to say that we are more comfortable with conflicts that end rapidly, and in a decisive and successful outcome. Our growing impatience with Vietnam was an example of this national trait.¹⁰ Secondly, the use of great violence in settling these types of conflicts is not desirable. This is in direct opposition to the United States' preference for coming into a conflict with overwhelming firepower to quickly destroy the opposition. Finally, while it has been alluded to above, the United States likes conflicts to end in a decisive and successful

outcome. It is not possible to ensure that this will be the case in these types of conflicts. There are too many variables that could lead to failure or a mixed outcome. These are not conflict conclusions that are healthy for a President's career or easily accepted by the American people. As a result, these types of actions have been and should continue to be the exceptions and not the rule.

Security operations dominated the types of conflicts that the United States was involved in prior to World War II. After 1945, only about 12 percent of all of the conflicts could be characterized as security operations. However, the United States has demonstrated a propensity for committing forces quite frequently when American property or personnel are threatened. These findings were discussed above in the Interests Endangered section of this chapter. As a result, it is likely that these types of operations where the United States deploys to secure personnel or property in a foreign land can be expected to be important in the future. The relative occurrence of these types of operations would not be expected to vary from its current rate in the future.

Counterterrorism, especially as it pertains to the ongoing narco conflict, can be expected to increase in the future. Terrorism has only become a phenomenon in the last 25 years, so the data on previous conflicts does not show many instances of counterterrorism. In fact, only the Desert One rescue mission in 1980 has been counted in this category. The other instances where United States forces have been used against terrorists have been counted as conventional operations due to the nature of the commitment of United States' forces. Another reason why these types of operations are not more

prevalent in the data is the secretive nature of counterterrorist operations. While there certainly have been other counterterrorist operations where United States forces were committed, they are either considered part of everyday peacetime competition or are classified. In either case, they are not included in the data set.

Noncombat operations will undoubtedly continue to gain importance in the future. Since 1900, there have only been nine conflicts characterized as noncombat operations. However, with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the power vacuum created by this breakup throughout the rest of the world, there will be a number of internal conflicts such as what is occurring in Yugoslavia between Slovenia and Croatia and external conflicts such as the tensions between Iraq and Turkey which will require intervention in the form of peacekeeping and nation assistance forces. The United States will see this intervention as both necessary and humane.

The final type of conflict is conventional operations. This has been the most prevalent type of conflict both recently and throughout the period from 1900 to the present. Once again, the power vacuum discussed above caused by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union will lead to regional conflicts that will inevitably involve the United States. Furthermore, the lack of a counter balance to deter the United States from becoming involved in a conflict, which in the past could have led to superpower escalation with the potential for strategic nuclear exchange, will in all likelihood entice the United States into conflicts that we would have avoided

previously. For this reason, the number of conflicts the United States becomes involved in per year will probably increase.

It follows that the total number of conflicts per year is likely to increase. This is especially true for conventional operations, noncombat operations and counterterrorism. Security operations will continue to be a necessary tool to protect United States citizens and property. The United States will continue to be reluctant to become involved in internal conflicts of nations.

Likely Region of Conflict

This section will examine the topic of where the United States is likely to commit forces in the future. The eight areas or regions discussed previously will form the basis for this discussion.¹¹ They are: North America, Central America, South America, Caribbean, Europe, Africa, Middle East and East Asia.

In general, the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower and the vacuum that this series of events created has increased the likelihood of regional conflicts throughout the world. Any region that the Soviet Union has vacated abruptly within the last two years has the potential for conflict as regional powers attempt to reach a new equilibrium and work to establish new security arrangements and balance. This is a process that is likely to take some time to establish. Consider that the Cold War began in 1946 and the Warsaw Pact was not solidified into its pre-collapse stature until 1968 with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the Cold War relationships that developed in Europe were established over a

period of over 45 years. So the process of establishing a new balance is also likely to take some time.

Obviously, certain regions are more likely to attract United States interest than others. The focus will be on these likely problem areas although all regions will be discussed.

There are also several areas of the world that have been omitted from the analysis. For example, Australia and South Asia (the region including India and her neighbors) were not discussed. They have been omitted simply because the United States has not committed forces in the region since 1900. This is an indication either the areas are peaceful and friendly to the United States or that we have very limited interests in the region. In either case, this trend makes future force commitments to the region unlikely.

North America

North America is the closest region to the United States by virtue of the fact that we are on this continent. There has been little intervention by the United States since 1900 as only Mexico has been involved in a conflict with the United States. However, both nations are significantly different than when the conflicts occurred. All nations within North America have stable and secure systems of government, and relationships between the United States and the rest of North America can be characterized as cooperative. This can be seen daily on a myriad of issues ranging from immigration to the environment to halting the flow of illegal drugs. The use of military forces for any reason short of humanitarian or security assistance at the request of the hosting government is both out of the question

and counterproductive to United States security interests. This is the least likely region for the use of military force. The only exception is the use of military forces in support of the drug war where the military is the executive agent for detecting and interdicting the transport of illegal drugs bound for the United States.

Central America

Central America is a region where the United States has recently shown more interest again. From 1900 to 1945, there were 17 instances of the use of military force in the region by the United States. Most of these conflicts were categorized as security operations. However, from 1945 to 1980, there was no intervention by United States military forces. This trend was reversed recently as there have been five conflicts where the United States has committed forces since 1980 including Operation Just Cause in Panama.

There are several factors that contribute to the importance of the region to the United States and increase the likelihood of the commitment of forces to Central America within the next 20 years. First, the region is geographically close to the United States so turmoil and instability in this region tends to attract our attention. Also, the fact that Central America borders on Mexico where democratic institutions are in their infancy causes concern to the United States. It would not be in our interest to have destabilizing factions from Central America exporting their instability to Mexico. Therefore, in support of emerging democratic institutions, it is possible that the United States would commit forces. This is

potentially one of two regions where the use of United States forces in support of internal national conflicts such as insurgency, coup d'etat or counter insurgency is not out of the question.

Secondly, Central America by virtue of its geographic position is a transshipment or refuel point for illegal drugs enroute from South America to the United States. We have already demonstrated our national resolve concerning the halting of the flow of drugs into our country in Operation Just Cause as well as our actions in the ongoing narco conflict. If it was perceived to be in our national interest to use military forces in Central America to halt the flow of drugs then it is likely that we would, in fact, use military force. While it would be preferable to use military force in conjunction with the militaries of Central American countries, this is not a prerequisite for committing forces.

Thirdly, the geographic proximity to the United States enhances the requirement for cooperation between the our nation and this region. Areas such as the environment, immigration and halting the flow of illegal drugs require close cooperation.

A special note of caution concerning the region is required due to the Panama Canal. This waterway is both a potential terrorist target and a source of friction in the region. As a terrorist target, the United States would in all likelihood find it necessary to intervene with military force if the long-term viability of the canal was threatened by terrorists. Another pivotal point occurs in 1999 when the canal is turned over to Panama. Potential changes in the manner in which the waterway is operated or limitations on its use could propel the United States into a conflict.

The military could be committed in Central America to any of the seven types of conflicts discussed previously. While the United States will continue to be reluctant to become involved militarily in the affairs of any nations of the world, this region has perhaps the most potential for this type of intervention. In addition, security operations, counterterrorism, conventional operations and noncombat operations continue to be likely as changes in this region continue. It is important to remember that while Central America is moving towards democracy and human rights, there is still development that is ongoing. This development will require time.

Overall, the region is best suited to low intensity conflicts as it is primarily composed of dense jungles and mountainous terrain. However, most nations in the region have some limited armored capability. The notable exception is Nicaragua which has a medium-sized armored force and is the largest military (and political-economic-social) threat in the region. As a result, any conventional operations in the region are most likely to be low or medium-low intensity.

South America

South America is a region in which United States military intervention for any reason except counter narcotics is unlikely. Since 1900, there have only been three conflicts where we have committed forces in this region. All of these commitments were recent (i.e., since 1984), and two of the three were related to drug initiatives; the other was United States support to the British during the Falkland Islands conflict.

The region has a common history with that of the United States, and for the most part there are well established governments in control of individual nations. Many of the countries are poor by United States standards, and economic reordering is required; however, these adjustments are likely to be conducted within the framework of existing governments rather than through revolutionary means.

There are regional conflicts which divide the nations of South America and cause instability. In the past, they have involved many complex issues including border disputes and mineral rights. These conflicts are not new and have been at great cost to the people of South America. For example, Paraguay "engaged in a war with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay between 1865 and 1870, which cost the lives of 80 percent of her male population."¹² However, it is unlikely that the United States would want to commit forces in these conflicts. The United States could conceivably support with security assistance in the form of training and equipment if requested by host governments. This is in keeping with normal peacetime practices which are ongoing today. So while we certainly support and encourage economic growth, the spread of democratic institutions and the promotion of human rights, the United States is unlikely to use our own military to achieve these goals for a South American nation.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that a South American nation would request or accept such intervention from the United States. Their independent attitudes make it likely that they would be reluctant and even offended if the United States was to conduct a security

operation, offer to support in counterterrorist operations or conduct noncombat operations in their countries. While South America can not be considered to be anti-United States, they certainly have a desire to remain independent actors in the international community. This desire makes direct use of United States military forces unlikely in the region. It is worth stating directly that large scale, overt military intervention is out of the question in South America.

As a result, the only potential for the commitment of United States forces in South America would be in support of anti-drug efforts. Most probably and preferably, this commitment would be at the request of or in cooperation with host nation forces. However, this would not a requirement.

The Caribbean

The Caribbean is similar to Central America in its potential for the commitment of United States forces. Its geographic proximity to the United States makes it of interest to our national security policy. In fact, it is the only other region in the world where there is the potential for intervention in support of internal national conflicts such as insurgency, coup d'etat or counter insurgency. The successful use of the United States military in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is an example of the use of our forces in the region for these purposes. However, contrary to Central America where democracy seems to be gaining a foothold, the Caribbean's future appears to be more uncertain. This greatly complicates the use of force as the outcomes of these types of conflicts tend to be uncertain; thus, we will remain reluctant to become overly committed.

Security operations in the Caribbean are likely in the event of instability in the region. If United States personnel or property are threatened, we will undoubtedly respond to secure these interests. While the operation in Grenada was classified in the data as a conventional operation due to the manner in which it was conducted and the objectives of the operation, there was a security aspect to this conflict (i.e., the protection of the medical students). This provides an example of the potential for both security and conventional operations in this region.

Another potential for the direct application of military forces is in support of noncombat operations such as disaster relief. This assistance would be at the request of the host nation.

The overall assessment is that military forces could be committed in the Caribbean to any of the seven types of conflicts. While the United States will continue to be reluctant to become involved militarily in the internal affairs of any nations of the world, this region has perhaps one of only two regions that have the potential for this type of intervention. In addition, security operations, counterterrorism, conventional operations and noncombat operations continue to be likely as the region evolves. The intensity of any conventional operations most likely would be a low to medium intensity conflict. However, several nations do have limited quantities of main battle tanks. Most notable is Cuba which has over 600 T-54/55 tanks.

Europe

Europe is a region that has a long history of turmoil and armed conflict. It has served as a proving ground for the development of contemporary military thought since the 18th Century. Most recently two world wars were fought on this relatively small, but densely populated continent which stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals mountains in the Soviet Union. For the past 45 years from 1945 to 1989, it has been the focal point for the Cold War.

Europe happens to be one of the most developed regions of the world economically, politically, socially and most importantly militarily. It is also an extremely diverse region with a number of different cultures, religions and nationalities. These differences have been the source of most of the problems and instabilities in the region. However, perhaps the most important aspect of this region for the United States is the strong ties that we have with Europe. The roots of our nation in terms of both genealogy and our government are in Europe, and thus the continent has played a big part in American history.

Recent events have only underscored the potential for serious armed conflict to resolve issues. During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact faced off along the Inter-German Border (IGB) that separated East and West Germany. The single line became the concentration point for 37,000 Warsaw Pact tanks and 12,000 NATO tanks.¹³ All in all, the region had approximately 52,000 Warsaw Pact tanks and 24,000 NATO tanks facing off in Europe.

The recent Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Negotiations sought to redress these imbalances. Its goals were to:

(1) Establish a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, (2) Eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security in the region, and (3) Eliminate, as a matter of priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.¹⁴ The CFE agreement was signed by all participating nations in 1990. Once implemented, it would greatly eliminate the previous disparities that existed between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. However, with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the uncertain nature of the future security arrangements in the region, little if any progress was made toward reaching the goals as stated above.

Consider that in the last two years, the Germanies have been reunited; the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved; the Soviet Union has dissolved and reformed as a Commonwealth of 11 independent states (although not all are in Europe); the Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have broken away from the old Soviet Union as has the republic of Georgia; there is fighting in the streets of Yugoslavia as several of its states are attempting to gain independence; Europe is creating a common market that will represent the largest single economic power in the world; and nationalist sentiments are stirring throughout the continent. These are just some of the problems facing Europe. Experts have noted cautiously that the Europe of the year 2000 looks quite similar to the Europe of 1900 which contributed to two World Wars.¹⁵

Another obvious concern is the weaponry available in the region. The Soviet Union had a total of 27,000 nuclear weapons and France, Germany and the United Kingdom all have nuclear weapons

as well. Chemical and perhaps biological weapons are also available in the region. The largest collection of conventional military hardware including modern aircraft, tanks, artillery, armored fighting vehicles, ships and helicopters in the world are in this relatively small region.

The previous discussion is focused on one major theme. This region and the actors involved have been and will remain both important and potentially threatening to the United States' national security. It is not too long ago that the United States and Soviet Union appeared not far from a potential nuclear confrontation with each having air and missile crews on standby to deliver these weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence and deliberate escalation were the cornerstones of our national security strategy. While the threats appear to have diminished, the capabilities still exist to threaten the United States directly.

Another potential source of friction is Europe's growing economic interdependence and competition with the United States. Obviously, time will be required to assess the impact of this new European union. However, it is worth cautioning that economics has led the United States to become involved in conflicts in the past. This is particularly significant in light of the increased importance being given to economic development within our country.

The large number of armored vehicles on the continent makes any type of solely light force intervention virtually improbable. However, light forces in conjunction with armored forces could be utilized in the region.

All of these events or trends noted above are cause for great concern. The political, economic, social and military ties that the United States has in the region make the potential for intervention likely in the event of a major altercation. However, in keeping with recent United States trends, it is unlikely that we would become involved in any internal national struggles (such as insurgencies, coup d'etats or counterinsurgencies) for the same reasons as discussed previously for the other regions. To date, we have adopted a cautious "wait and see" attitude that we have used to allow nations and even groups of nations to decide their own destiny, while remaining neutral and attempting to minimize the alienation of any of the parties involved.

Security operations and counterterrorist conflicts involving the United States remain possible for the region; however, it is likely that European nations would prefer to handle these situations internally and would not want the United States' intervention.

The likelihood of both conventional operations and noncombat operations has actually increased since the end of the Cold War. Previously, a conventional war in Europe was almost unthinkable as the NATO policy of deliberate escalation coupled with the Warsaw Pact's overwhelming numerical superiority in weapon systems created a situation of stability which had the potential of becoming unstable and escalating into a strategic nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. This kept the superpower camps in check. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union diminishes the threat of this chain of events and thus increases the potential for conventional operations. The key for the United States is determining

if becoming involved in a particular regional conflict is vital to our national security interests. Noncombat operations such as peacekeeping duties could conceivably be utilized throughout the region. Recent examples include Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey (although this operation was primarily conducted in what is considered to be the Middle East). The potential certainly exists for some type of noncombat operations in Yugoslavia after the fighting to help restore stability to the area.

Europe will continue to be of considerable interest to the United States. We have strong ties to the region and have already demonstrated our resolve during two World Wars and the Cold War which lasted for 45 years. As the continent seeks to develop a new security framework to replace the East-West confrontation, there will be instability and uncertainty for all nations including the United States.

Africa

Africa is a region where the United States has appeared to have a hands off policy concerning the commitment of military forces for the resolution of conflicts for much of the continent. Only in specific countries has the United States intervened with military forces since World War II: Zaire (1960-1964, 1967, 1978), Egypt (1956, 1983), Libya (1981, 1983 (Chad against Libya), 1986, 1989), Somalia (1990) and Liberia (1990). Most of these conflicts have involved the deployment of small contingents of military personnel for a relatively short duration in a support role rather than in a direct combat role. The notable exception to this is the bombing of Libya in 1986, and two conventional operations in Egypt (1956) and Liberia

(1990) which have involved the evacuation of United States personnel from combat areas.

Africa is a troubled continent ravaged by disease, famine, civil wars and violence. The extreme conditions have kept the United States from intervening as it has been perceived that there is little to be gained through intervention. The problems in the region are long-term and seem to have no real culminating points. A major source of conflict is fighting among tribal nations which is fueled by differences in racial and ethnic backgrounds. The Strategic Survey 1990-1991 published by the IISS comments on some of the tribal fighting calling the area "a horrifying area of physical slaughter and political-confusion."¹⁶ Another important point that has kept the United States out of conflicts in the region has been the ability of the United States to stay out of entangling relationships that could draw us into a regional African conflicts coupled with the localized nature of the conflicts (i.e., there has been little attempt by Africa nations to draw the United States into their regional disputes). It is worth noting that the region appears to be leaning toward democracy. In several countries, free elections are beginning to replace the previous method for selecting a new government, coup d'etat.¹⁷ So while the conditions in Africa are dismal, there are some indications of slow improvement.

The weaponry available on the continent, with some notable exceptions, tends to be small arms, light artillery and lightly armored vehicles. Most nations also have a handful of Soviet main battle tanks and older model MiG aircraft. As discussed previously, Libya does have a formidable arsenal including chemical weapons, and

South Africa has large weapons holdings including main battle tanks, modern aircraft and nuclear weapons.

In assessing the potential for United States forces being committed to conflicts in Africa in the future, the following modification to the region will be considered. Northern Africa including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco will be considered in the Middle East analysis. This delineation will be made as most of the problems in this portion of Africa are related to Middle East tensions. Furthermore, this areas' history and ideologies are related more to the Middle East than to Africa.

Considering the remainder of Africa, it is unlikely that the United States will become involved in any type of conflict in this region. The only exception to this statement is the potential for security operations similar to that conducted in Liberia (1990). Even peacekeeping operations are unlikely as the region is so violent, unpredictable and unstable that a peacekeeping force could become embroiled in a conflict merely through its presence.

Middle East

The Middle East is another region with a long history of struggle and violence. Many like to point to the creation of Israel by the Balfour Declaration in 1948 as the beginning of the region's problems. However, this is not the case. For thousands of years, the Middle East has been a crossroads for three of the world's major religions (Christianity, Judaism, and Islam). This has created a natural animosity in the region with little hope of a lasting peace. Furthermore, any hope for peace in the Middle East has been

dampened by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism which has its roots in the region.

Israel continues to be the focal point for Arab hostilities. Settlement issues, occupied territories, treatment of Arabs residing in Israel and the Arab cries for a Palestinian nation head the list of complaints. Israel has done little to alleviate the situation and placate the Arab nations. For the United States, the bipolarity of the region is a recipe for trouble. We have long-term commitments to Israel, but these commitments anger the Arabs that claim unequal treatment by the United States; recently, there has been increased sympathy in this country for the Arab plight. We have supported Israel strongly during previous Arab-Israeli Wars, and this too is a cause for concern to Arabs. The peace talks which were initiated recently are a good sign; however, the negotiations are between moderate Arabs and Israel. The more militant Arabs, those that support nothing less than the destruction of Israel, are not involved in the peace talk process. This is at the heart of the fundamentalist movement.

Fundamentalism is purported to be a return to the traditional way of Islamic life for its followers. However, it is more than that as well. It is an anti-democratic movement in the same way that Communism was the antithesis of democracy. Therefore, it is not simply enough that a nation becomes fundamentalist - there is a desire on the part of a fundamentalist to export these beliefs. This is where the movement creates problems for the rest of the world.

In contrast to Africa which has allowed the United States to remain a bystander in their affairs, Middle East nations actively

pursue United States intervention. Israel requires and even demands United States support as do the more moderate Arab states. Arab terrorist organizations target United States personnel and property which as has been discussed above is a sure way to get the United States to commit forces. So remaining neutral and detached in this region has been problematic.

Another problem in the Middle East is nationalism. An example of this is the situation in the Persian Gulf involving the Kurds. This is another long-term problem which stems from the Kurdish nation's aggression against its neighbors. Kurds are a "nation without a state," but the recent determination that there are vast oil reserves within its area is causing additional animosity as other nations vie for these reserves.

Major regional conflicts currently ongoing include Iraq-Iran, Iraq-Turkey, Arab-Israeli, and Israel-Lebanon. As an example of the difficulty in resolving these disputes, consider the following. The conflict between Iran and Iraq dates back to a murder that took place over a millennium ago, and there appears to be no room for compromise for either parties. The conflict or Jihad (holy war), has already resulted in countless deaths on both sides.

Another problem in the region is the number of dictators in control of the governments in the Middle East. Two examples of dictator controlled regimes which have been unfriendly to the United States and have infringed upon our national security interests are Libya and Iraq. The United States has taken action against both these nations in our recent past.

The problems in this region have been complicated by the tremendous holdings of conventional weapons, and the continuing desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Most nations in the region have active chemical programs and biological testing facilities, and several covet entrance into the world nuclear club of which Israel is probably already a member. Virtually all nations in the region present a modest armored threat and have second and third generation Soviet made aircraft.

The region is also a major transportation hub and has a major share of the oil reserves in the world. The Suez Canal is of major strategic importance to the free flow of goods and materials. It reduces the sailing time from the United States to Saudi Arabia from 11,000 nautical miles (NM) to 7,000 NM. The oil reserves obviously are of major import to the United States and help, in part, to explain why the United States was willing to become involved in a regional dispute in the Middle East, but is far less anxious for a similar conflict in a region such as Africa. It is important to remember that Saddam claimed that Kuwait was actually part of Iraq and that Iraq was reclaiming part of its territory. If this same conditioned occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, it is doubtful that we would have interjected United States military forces.

There is some good news for some nations of the region. Egypt has become a moderate Arab state, and hopefully others will begin to lean in this direction. The peace talks can only improve the Arab-Israeli relations. Cooperation in the war against Saddam Hussein was also a bright spot in the region's history.

However, overall the Middle East remains a troubled region of the world where United States military intervention will likely occur. The only types of conflict not likely for the United States to become involved in are insurgencies, coup d'etats and counterinsurgencies. However, security operations, combatting terrorism, conventional operations and noncombat operations all remain viable and probable types of conflict which the United States will commit forces to in the future. The nature of the threat will dictate that in most conflicts which require conventional operations, heavy forces will be required. Special operations forces will probably see use across the continuum, but will be especially useful in combatting terrorism. Light forces potentially have a role in noncombat operations such as peacekeeping duties and nation assistance, although heavy forces could also fulfill this role. As this area tends to be very volatile, hostilities in the Middle East tend to arise and reach a peak quickly. This complicates the United States' ability to employ forces as there is only limited prepositioning of equipment in the region.

East Asia

East Asia is another area where the United States has had a history of committing forces. The region includes South-East Asia, as well as Far-East Asia. There are two aspects of the region that require consideration. First, United States intervention in East Asia has not always met with success. Intervention in Vietnam (1946-1975), China (1948-1949), Thailand (1960-1965), and Laos (1962-1975) have failed to result in a successful outcome. Only in Korea and marginally in the Philippines has the United States been

successful in this region. Secondly, this is a region which is undergoing significant economic development. However, this development is not uniform throughout the region. For example, Japan and South Korea have become significant economic powers. Yet, in South-East Asia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are making little progress. This inequitable distribution of wealth will contribute to tensions and possibly even military conflict within the region.

Looking at the historical perspective, our intervention in the region since the beginning of the Cold War can be linked directly to the policy of containment that we followed. We planned to halt the spread of Communism throughout the world and this was an area where Communism was beginning to take hold due to the poor economic conditions. However, with the reduction of the threat of the spread of Communism and the end to our policy of containment, this rationale for committing United States forces in this region has been eliminated.

Regional assessments in Asian Defense indicate that China will be "economically limited but militarily powerful with the capability of military force projection into mainland Asia and, through its navy, into the South China Sea and Indian Ocean,"¹⁸ and Japan will be "economically powerful but with no significant military power."¹⁹ So while the the commitment of forces is unlikely, the potential would exist for intervention if China, for example, decided to establish exclusive rights over the South China Sea. However, this is not a probable scenario. Another aspect of China's military is that she is part of the world's nuclear club so a direct United States-China conflict has the potential for nuclear escalation which is not in either

sides' interest. While Japan has the economic capability to build a powerful military, they do not appear to have the political consensus to make this happen in the foreseeable future.

One exception concerning the United States' potential commitment of forces is in order. The United States has strong ties to South Korea, and would undoubtedly support this nation if she was threatened by North Korea. Any conflict between the Koreas would be of a conventional operation type and the intensity of the conflict would be mid to high. A conflict here does have the potential for nuclear escalation if North Korea acquires these types of weapons or it becomes necessary for the United States to "protect" South Korea's long-term integrity. However, even in the Koreas, there is some indication that there may a move toward normalizing relations between these countries.

Overall, East Asia tends to be quite unstable. Democracies do not flourish in the region and violence is quite widespread. Even in countries where there has been economic progress, the people do not have high standards of living, and they are generally oppressed.

However, even given these problems, the United States is not likely to become involved in a military conflict in this region given the history of our commitments. Furthermore, the two major powers in the region, China and Japan, are not likely to challenge our interests militarily and a chain of events whereby the United States would commit forces in this region is somewhat difficult to postulate. Only support of South Korea holds potential for the commitment of military force.

Certainly, insurgencies, coup d'etats and counterinsurgencies are highly unlikely types of conflicts for the United States to commit forces in this region. Security operations are always possible for the protection of United States property and personnel, and noncombat operations remain possible as well. However, it appears that the only potential for conventional operations is in South Korea as was discussed above.

Overall Assessment of Regions for the Commitment of Forces.

Figure 9 below summarizes the analysis on the likely region of conflict for future commitments of United States forces. The regions have been placed in three categories depending on the likelihood of commitment of United States forces. Within each of the categories, the regions have also been ranked. So for the "very likely" category, the Middle East has more potential for the commitment of forces than Central America which in turn has more potential than the Caribbean. Note also that the North African nations of Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco have been included in the Middle East category as discussed previously.

<p>EAST ASIA SOUTH AMERICA NORTH AMERICA</p>	<p>EUROPE AFRICA</p>	<p>MIDDLE EAST CENTRAL AMERICA CARIBBEAN</p>
<p>NOT LIKELY</p>	<p>LIKELY</p>	<p>VERY LIKELY</p>

Figure 9. Likely Region of Commitment of United States Forces.

FORCE REQUIREMENTS.

This section will provide in an overview manner the types of forces that will be required by the United States military in dealing with future threats to national security interests. This analysis will be based on the national security interests of the United States that were presented earlier in this chapter. In addition, the characteristics of future threats that were also analyzed in this chapter have been utilized. From this information, it is possible to describe the future force requirements for our nation.

The requirements statement will not be at the service level. No attempt will be made to assess or predict the number of Army divisions, Air Force wings, Navy Fleets or Marine Expeditionary Units that will be required to deal with future threats. This analysis will focus on the broad capabilities that will be needed for the military to respond to the evolving world situation.

In considering future force requirements, it is imperative to keep in mind that the threat that we have designed forces around for the past 45 years (i.e., Communism, NATO-Warsaw Pact tensions, United States-Soviet tensions) has been significantly reduced, and is no longer our most likely threat. It does remain a potentially dangerous threat as even with its uncertain future, the Soviet Union still is the only nation with the capability to destroy the United States.

As a result many of the defense programs and buildups that were directly related to war on Europe's Central Front and combatting the Soviets should be reevaluated and subsequently reduced. Our massive POMCUS stocks are an example of a program

which has lost some relevance in light of recent changes in East-West relations. Clearly, it will remain in our interest to have a rapid reinforcement capability forward stationed on the continent; this capability should include both forces and equipment. However, the total number of division sets in POMCUS should be reduced commensurate with the reduction in threat.

The buildup of the National Guard and Reserves (NG/R) is another area where restructuring is required. There was a significant increase in the NG/R during the military buildup of the 1980s under the Reagan administration. From FY 82 to FY 91, there was an increase in NG/R from 974,600 to 1,175,900.²⁰ This represents a growth of over 20 percent during this period. Their stated mission was to rapidly reinforce Europe in time of crisis. This buildup was both necessary and prudent to counter the threat presented by the Warsaw Pact. However, the Warsaw Pact no longer is a viable threat in the manner in which it was before, and a large-scale attack against NATO is no longer a realistic possibility.

As a minimum, NG/R should be reduced to these early 1980 levels. In addition, it would be prudent to examine alternative force structures that would better prepare these forces for regional conflicts. For example, mobilization for Southwest Asia provided insights into the missions and forces best suited for the NG/R. In general, support forces, which do not require synchronization on the battlefield and in which there are specialized skill requirements, are best suited to Army NG/R units. These types of forces require little train-up time and can be prepared for deployment quickly. In contrast, armored brigades, which require great synchronization, are

not conducive for NG/R as the 39 days training per year does not adequately prepare these units for combat - thus additional long-term training is required after mobilization to prepare these types of units for combat.²¹

Our nuclear programs, both tactical and strategic, should also be greatly reduced. These programs were primarily designed to counter the Soviet nuclear threat. With the reduction of this threat, nuclear forces lose much of their relevance. Clearly, the United States must remain a nuclear power and have adequate numbers of these weapons for deterrence and even warfighting in special cases. However, development of weapons systems such as the B-2 bomber, the Minuteman ICBM, and the Midgetman ICBM are significant drains on the national wealth and detract from other more necessary defense programs. Furthermore, the neat and tidy theory of deterrence that many believe kept the Warsaw pact in check does not translate to the regions in which the United States is most likely to commit forces in the future. Experience in Southwest Asia indicates that our nuclear arsenal was of little or no use against Iraq and Saddam. This is either because Saddam and his regime lack the understanding of deterrence in the United States-Soviet sense, or the threat of nuclear escalation was not credible to Saddam. There is little expectation that our nuclear arsenal would be of more use in any other third world country. As a result, nuclear programs should be focused on keeping our warheads maintained, while spending on new programs should be minimized. Overall, nuclear stockpiles can afford to be significantly reduced with no major impact on national security.

The nature of conflicts where the United States will commit forces in the future will be regional. These conflicts will develop rapidly and will require a rapid response from the United States. In addition, they will be in a variety of locations which will complicate the ability of the United States to economically preposition equipment on land in these regions. The areas will tend to be underdeveloped with only minimal infrastructure. Thus, the United States will have to rely on bringing most of what is required for setting up lodgements, survival and warfighting.

Aspects of deploying a force to Europe that we have taken for granted must be reevaluated. The host nation support that we counted on for a European scenario will not be available. Infrastructure development through aggressive security assistance programs are critical to creating these in country capabilities for future regional commitments.

As was discussed in the Future Threats portion of this chapter, virtually all nations in the world are acquiring or already have some armored capability. Thus, the ability of the United States to rely solely on light forces is questionable. In fact, most commitments of United States forces will require a heavy-light-special operations mix of forces in order to have overwhelming combat power and minimize casualties during combat operations. Weapons of mass destruction also increase the requirement for specialized forces and protective measures. For example, tactical ballistic missiles (such as the SCUDs used by Iraq) could be devastating in future conflicts with improved delivery systems. To counter this threat, anti-missile forces and protection such as chemical protective overgarments are necessary.

It is also necessary to refocus our Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence (C³I) efforts throughout the world where potential trouble spots are likely to occur. Our East-West focus has tended to give the United States blinders as far as C³I is concerned. We planned for a deployment to Europe which was a robust theater with much of our C³I in place. This is significantly different from what we are likely to face in the future. In fact, the model for what we are likely to face is the austere Southwest Asia theater that we faced for Operation Desert Storm. During peacetime, intelligence must be refocused to provide adequate indications and warning of threat indications. This includes improving our use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as well as the refocusing of our electronic sources. Electronic intelligence gathering is critical, however without well developed HUMINT sources the intentions of the threat are nearly impossible to judge.

It is also critical that the United States retain enough capability to respond to two major regional conflicts simultaneously. This a requirement that was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a generic new threat for force development activities. Retaining this sort of capability has already proved necessary during the Gulf War timeframe. During the crisis, the United States was involved in three other operations including the evacuation of civilians from Liberia and Somalia and Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey. In addition, there was trouble in the Philippines where United States forces were put on alert for possible deployment.

The range of conventional operations that our forces can expect to be committed to varies greatly. However, the likelihood is that

conflicts which range from the bombing raid on Libya 1986 to Southwest Asia in 1990-1991 will increase in the future (i.e., the range from lower-mid intensity warfare to lower-high intensity warfare). Conflicts will be joint and combined operations characterized by violent, rapid exchanges of short duration. Single service commitments will also be extremely unlikely in the future.

Peacetime engagements which include all types of conflicts excluding conventional operations will be an important part of military commitments in the future. The only exception will be insurgencies, coup d'etat and counterinsurgencies where the United States will remain reluctant to become involved in the internal affairs of other nations.

Noncombat operations and security operations will continue to provide challenging missions for our military forces. In fact, the likelihood of these types of conflicts has increased with the new world order. Once again, a range of heavy-light and special operations forces will be required to respond to these contingencies. Support forces such as engineers, military police, communications, logistics and supply forces for the Army and airlift forces for the Air Force will certainly be called upon to fill this role.

Counterterrorist operations will also be important. Primarily, special operations forces from the Army, Air Force and Navy will be utilized in these types of conflicts. However, as we have seen during events such as the Achille Lauro hijacking, conventional forces also have an important role to play.

A key factor in the ability of the United States to respond rapidly will be the adequacy of our strategic lift program. Clearly,

airlift will be required for the initial deployment of forces. However, historically, 99 percent of all resupply and 95 percent of all forces will deploy by sea. Today, our national sealift program is in dire straits, and little is being done to improve the condition. The Army has stated a requirement for enough fast sealift to deploy a three division Army corps and its support simultaneously. Satisfying this requirement is critical to the ability of the military to respond to future regional threats.²²

The ability to deploy forces to isolated areas can also be improved by prepositioning ships that can rapidly steam to required regions. The Marines already have an aggressive prepositioning program that is used to help them respond quickly to regional conflicts. However, this capability should be expanded to include all of the services.

Technology will continue to be important to the military in dealing with future conflicts. The United States has historically relied upon technology to give us the edge. The most recent example was in Operation Desert Storm where the impact of a technologically superior force going against a Third World power with large weapons holdings was highlighted. Technology gave us an overwhelming advantage and greatly reduced Allied casualties in the process. Maintaining this technology edge will continue to be important in future conflicts. This means that the United States cannot afford to mortgage our military future by halting the extensive research and development programs. Our nation's scientists and defense contractors must be encouraged to continue to develop new, innovative and promising capabilities.

An example of where technology development must continue is in the area of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and related spin-off technologies. While it is clear that development of a full SDI system as was originally envisioned would not be fiscally prudent, a smaller version of the system for home defense as well as a deployable package are required to confront the missile technology proliferation which is putting these dangerous weapons in the hands of an increasing number of third world nations.

The requirement for forces of all services is best be summed up by former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Vuono. He states that forces must be "versatile (able to respond to a widening array of challenges), deployable (able to project substantial combat power rapidly wherever our interests are threatened) and lethal (to bolster deterrence and lethal to ensure defense)."²³

A final important requirement for the military is that it remains flexible and expansible. Today the military is contemplating large reductions in funding and force structure. However, these trends can easily be altered and a large military buildup be initiated as the nature of the international threat changes and the United States' national security strategy evolves.

PRIORITIES FOR THE DEFENSE BUDGET.

The priorities for future defense budgets are directly linked to previous analysis. The future force requirements discussed above explicitly discuss or provide a good indication of the areas where future defense spending must be reevaluated and adjusted as we

move into the 21st Century in this new international security landscape that we face following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.

Before examining the future allocation of the budget by mission categories, it is necessary to state some fundamental realities that the services will face as they develop their future budgets.

- There will be a negative real growth in future budgets. This is both necessary and prudent given the significant reduction in the Warsaw Pact/Soviet threat and the struggling national economy.

- Cooperation between the services will be required in these upcoming lean budget years. Historical service parochialism, if left unchecked, will have dire consequences. It would hinder the ability of the military to respond adequately to future threats.

- Maintaining a balanced force will be critical. Future threats are likely to be more robust in terms of overall capabilities. The United States forces to confront these threats must be equal to any foreseeable challenges, and capable of deploying, fighting and sustaining themselves across the operational continuum. It would be unacceptable for the military to not be ready to respond when called upon. In the end, our mission remains simple: "To protect and defend the Constitution."

- All great ideas are not good ideas. There are many new and innovative weapons systems that we have developed or considered. However, they may be unaffordable within realistic budget constraints. It will be critical to be able to identify these unaffordable concepts and programs before they become a massive drain on the defense budget.

- Political realities drive the defense budget and the allocation of resources to major programs and weapon systems. Congress pays the defense bills and with this responsibility have a say in where the money is spent.

- Resources will be scarce, and the military and services must make due with the budgets that are allocated.

Changes to the defense spending trends are definitely in order in response to the evolving international security posture.

Recommendations for spending adjustments by the mission categories in depicted in Figure 10. It is important to note that the manner in which the spending adjustments are depicted was chosen to minimize comparisons between mission categories, and to focus on whether spending in a particular category should be increased, decreased or remain unchanged.




Figure 10. Adjustments to Mission Category Spending.

There are only two mission areas where an increase in relative spending is required: Airlift and Sealift, and Support of Other Nations. The most critical of the two is airlift and sealift where the United States was woefully inadequate during the Gulf War. It was fortunate that the United States was opposing a nation that allowed for a massive Allied buildup over a six month period. Not all aggressor nations are likely to allow us this luxury in the future. The outcome, at least in terms of casualties, could have been significantly altered if an opposed landing into Saudi Arabia had to be conducted. The timelines for deployment will need to be measured in terms of days and weeks rather than months. Support of other nations will become more important in peacetime competition. The United States can best hope to avoid instability by assisting nations in developing

themselves along lines that are favorable to our security interests. This includes providing education, training and equipment for foreign militaries. In addition, developing infrastructure in regions throughout the world also will benefit the United States as it will assist in creating facilities that will be beneficial for meeting future commitments. The State Department also has a portion of the budget dedicated to these endeavors.

Research and Development (R&D), Intelligence and Communications and Special Operations Forces are three mission areas where relative spending should remain at approximately current levels. Continuing R&D is important and must be maintained. It is an area which tends to be one of the first to be reduced during budget reductions yet has the greatest long-term impact on the armed forces. The significance and benefits of R&D were plainly obvious during the Gulf War and in part can be credited with saving many Allied lives. R&D in areas such as SDI is also important and provides many long-term benefits to the nation and the military.

Intelligence and communications is a mission area that needs to remain at approximately the same relative spending levels, yet efforts need to be refocused to better respond to the types of conflicts we are likely to face in the future. This means that the infrastructure must go from a Euro-focused system to one of a more global nature. The regions that we are likely to deploy to in the future will not have well developed communications systems, so the military must be self sufficient in this area as well.

Special operations forces also should remain at relative current funding levels. These forces will operate across the operational

continuum, and will see increased use in peacetime engagements. Once again, however, it is necessary to refocus the efforts of these forces to make them less Euro-focused.

General Purpose Forces is an area where there is potential for reduction in relative spending. The reduction in East-West tensions and the associated threat means that the military can reduce commensurate with the reduction in the threat. However, this statement does not translate into a reduction of all forces that had a European forward stationed or reinforcement mission. Reductions also should proceed slowly as the future of Europe is in a state of flux with the final disposition yet to be determined.

National Guard and Reserve (NG/R) is a mission area where significant cost savings are possible. Spending in this category should be reduced to pre-1980 levels before the Reagan buildup. This buildup was used to develop NG/R forces that would reinforce Europe in case of conflict. The reduction of the threat clearly suggests significant reductions here. It is worth noting that this will be a difficult category in which to achieve necessary cost savings because of the political realities associated with attempting to cut these units from individual states. Congress has shown great reluctance to cutting bases in their states, and has shown the same reluctance in cutting NG/R forces. A restructuring of these forces as discussed previously is also in order. This will be important to the ability of the NG/R to respond rapidly to regional conflicts.

Strategic Nuclear is the mission area which has the greatest relative cost savings potential. The reduction in nuclear threat from the Soviet Union mandates significant reductions in this mission area.

The quality nuclear forces that we possess today will continue to be sufficient for deterrence. Their capabilities have been proven over the past 45 years. Developing and procuring new, more expensive nuclear systems such as the B-2, Midgetman, and Minuteman is wasteful in light of changes in East-West security environment. If there was an unlimited budget then further development might be more realistic. However, these narrowly focused systems are draining resources from other more critical missions.

Central Supply and Maintenance; Training, Medical, and Other General Purpose Activities; and Administration and Support are mission areas where cost savings are possible. With reductions in the strategic nuclear, NG/R and general purpose force structure, the support forces should also be reduced commensurate to these new levels. To maintain support structure at current levels while greatly reducing combat and deterrent forces would leave an unbalanced total military force.

CONCLUSIONS.

This chapter presented an analysis of the following:

- Future strategic national interests and objectives,
- Trends for the employment of forces,
- Threat trends that are emerging in this post-Cold World era,
- The force requirements that will be required to combat these threats, and
- Necessary adjustments to the defense budget in light of changes in the international security landscape.

It is important to remember that this thesis considered the period from the present to approximately 2010. Therefore, analysis and conclusions presented in this chapter focused primarily on this 20 year period.

ENDNOTES

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- 2 National Security Strategy of the United States. The White House, 1991, p. 3.
- 3 Ibid., p. 1.
- 4 Accounts of this evolution which are discussed in the next two paragraphs are contained in [NDU, 1984], [Tonelson, 1991] and [Mearsheimer, 1990]. A synopsis of this transformation is also contained in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
- 5 Strategic Survey 1990-1991. International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Brassey's Inc., 1991, p.16.
- 6 The explanations of what forces were committed and the rationale for there commitment is contained in the following sources: America's Small Wars [Collins, 1991] and Instances of the Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1989 [CRS Report for Congress, 1989].
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 George Bush, "The Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudia Arabia," Speech delivered to the Nation, 8 August 1990.
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- 10 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy. (Indiana University Press, 1973), p.467-477.

- 11 Note that previously nine "areas" or "regions" were discussed. This included the global category of conflicts. This category will not be included in the discussion in this section.
- 12 John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft, Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p.135.
- 13 These figures are from a briefing given by CPT Daniel M. Gerstein, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Conventional Arms Control Negotiation Division in April 1989.
- 14 From the CFE Mandate Negotiating Objectives signed by all participating NATO and Warsaw Pact nations on 9 March 1989.
- 15 Presented in remarks made by General Gordon R. Sullivan during address to the Command and General Staff College on 12 September 1991.
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- 17 Ibid., p. 226.
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- 20 Annual Report to the President and the Congress. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1991), p 113.
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- 22 Additional information on fast sealift, strategic mobility and requirements for deployment can be obtained in the following document: Ultra-Fast Sealift Study (UFSS), CAA-SR-87-25, 1987, (SECRET-NOFORN).

23 Carl E. Vuono (General, USA), "The Strategic Value of Conventional Forces." In Parameters, September 1990, p. 174.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

BACKGROUND.

This thesis has investigated the national security strategy of the United States, the threats to our interests, military forces and their employment and current defense budget trends. From this baseline, projections were made concerning the future security requirements in the Post-Cold War world. Projected national interests were discussed, future threats and the military forces necessary to confront these threats were presented, and necessary budget adjustment recommendations were developed.

The important questions that were examined during the course of this thesis have been analyzed and are presented below.

RESULTS

The discussion in this section is intended to be short and to the point. For elaboration on the answers to these questions, readers should turn to the appropriate section of the thesis.

- What have been the strategic interests of the United States in the post-World War II era?

Since World War II, the United States and our Allies have followed a policy of containment which focused primarily on East-West tensions. In this policy, the United States and Soviet Union were the centers of gravity or superpower anchors of their respective alliances. Our stated interests from the National Security Strategy of the United States provides insight into our strategy. In Figure 11 below, the four major stated policy objectives are presented.

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

Figure 11. United States Stated Policy Goals.

- Under what conditions does the United States commit military forces?

Perhaps the best depiction of the conditions under which the United States would like to commit forces is the Weinberger Criteria (See Figure 12). These criteria represent the ideal conditions under which military forces should be committed. However, this is not always possible and these conditions have been violated throughout United States military history. Of some comfort is the fact that in the most recent major commitments, Operation Just Cause in Panama and

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia, the criteria were followed closely and military success was achieved.

- ✓ **US forces should only be committed to combat in defense of interests vital to our nation or our allies.**
- ✓ **US forces should only be committed in numbers adequate to complete the mission.**
- ✓ **US forces should only be committed when we have clearly defined political and military objectives.**
- ✓ **The relationship between objectives and forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.**
- ✓ **US forces should be committed only when there is reasonable assurance of support from the American people and Congress.**
- ✓ **US forces should only be committed as a last resort.**

Figure 12. Weinberger's Criteria for the Use of Military Power

The specifics of what has caused the United States to commit forces are quite simple. In general, our nation has responded with force for the following reasons in order of precedence:

(1) Threats to United States citizens and property. This trend has been prevalent throughout our history. The United States tends to respond after multiple threats or actions against its personnel and property. A single act is typically not sufficient to gain a United States response.

(2) Impact on the United States. This entails a test of whether a nation's actions impact or could impact in the future directly on the United States. The development of weapons of mass destruction by nations that have anti-American and anti-democratic leanings, drug trafficking, and our long-term economic viability are rationale that have caused us to commit forces in the past.

While much has been made of the United States' desire to promote human rights, political and economic freedom, and the spread of democratic institutions worldwide, these desires alone have not been sufficient to cause intervention. A more direct and tangible impact on the United States must be present for the commitment of military forces.

- How will/should these strategic interests change in light of the evolving world situation?

The national security interests of the United States are not likely to change rapidly or within the near future. They are firmly rooted in our history and can be traced back to the founding fathers and the Constitution. Our national goals are reflected in a number of national strategy documents including the National Security Strategy of the United States. However, the application of our national strategy is much more flexible and will likely change in this post-Cold War world.

In all likelihood, the United States will be the only superpower in the world during this 20 year period. As a result, we will have more flexibility in our approach to foreign policy and less challenge to intervention in international conflicts. This will cause a more regional focus for future conflicts and will probably increase the number of conflicts the military will be committed to from the present to 2010.

- How is the defense budget currently being allocated by broad mission categories?

The defense portion of the budget of the United States is broken down into 11 mission areas (See Table 9). These generally categorize the manner in which the defense budget is being allocated.

Table 9. Mission Categories for Defense Spending.

Major Missions and Programs	1988	Estimate		
	Actual	1989	1990	1991
Strategic Forces	19.8	21.2	23.4	27.6
General Purpose Forces	114.9	112.8	117.8	122.8
Intelligence and Communications	28.3	29.6	31.7	32.8
Airlift and Sealift	4.4	5.4	6.3	7.1
Guard and Reserve	16.9	17.2	17.2	17.8
Research and Development	28.4	29.1	32.1	32.6
Central Supply and Maintenance	24.3	25.3	27.0	28.1
Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities	37.3	38.5	40.0	42.1
Administration and Associated Activities	6.7	6.9	5.9	6.3
Support of other Nations	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.1
Special Operations Forces	2.0	3.2	3.1	2.6
TOTAL	283.8	290.2	305.6	320.9

- Is the United States spending its resources appropriately based on projected strategic interests and anticipated future requirements for military forces?

The short answer to the question is "No." The United States continues to spend large amounts of the defense budget in mission areas and within mission areas on programs that were begun in the Cold War. Defense spending needs to be reoriented to better accommodate the regional conflicts that are expected in the future.

The increased flexibility discussed above means that the number of regional conflicts that the United States becomes involved in is likely to increase. This is especially true for conventional operations,

noncombat operations and counterterrorist operations. In addition, security operations will continue to be a necessary tool to protect United States personnel and property. The United States will continue to be reluctant to become involved in the internal conflicts of nations such as insurgencies, coup d'etats and counterinsurgencies as these conflicts are unpredictable and we have had very limited success in these types of conflicts in the past.

Another trend concerning the nature of future conflicts is increasing intensity (and violence). As weapons proliferation trends continue, the intensity of the conflicts the United States becomes involved in is likely to increase. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the technology to produce these weapons also continues at an alarming rate. This translates to a requirement for United States forces to be adequately prepared to face these dangerous challenges.

Figure 13 below summarizes the analysis on the likely region of conflict for future commitments of United States forces. The regions have been placed in three categories depending on the likelihood of commitment of United States forces. Within each of the categories, the regions have also been ranked. So for the "very likely" category, the Middle East has more potential for the commitment of forces than Central America which in turn has more potential than the Caribbean. Note that Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco have been included in the Middle East rather than in Africa.

EAST ASIA	EUROPE	MIDDLE EAST
SOUTH AMERICA	AFRICA	CENTRAL AMERICA
NORTH AMERICA		CARIBBEAN

NOT LIKELY

LIKELY

VERY LIKELY

Figure 13. Likely Region of Commitment of United States Forces.

The range of conventional operations that our forces can expect to be committed to varies greatly. However, we can expect the trend towards increasing intensity to continue. Thus, we will see an increase in conflicts ranging from the bombing raid on Libya 1986 to Southwest Asia in 1990-1991. That is, the range is from lower-mid intensity warfare to lower-high intensity warfare. Conflicts will be joint and combined operations characterized by violent, rapid exchanges of short duration. Single service commitments are extremely unlikely.

Overall, the military will be smaller and more regional in nature. Reductions across the defense budget mission areas are warranted in all forces except Airlift and Sealift which needs be be significantly increased, and Special Operations Forces and Intelligence and Communications which need to be maintained at current levels. In addition increase Support For Other Nations will be important for the United States to achieve its national security goals as it will assist nations in doing more for themselves. Major reductions need to be implemented in Strategic Forces and the National Guard and Reserves with a more modest reduction in General Purpose Forces and support forces.

• What changes in this allocation will be required in the post-Cold War world?

Recommend adjustments to the current spending trends are depicted in Figure 14 for the 11 mission areas of defense spending. The focus of these recommendations is to restructure spending from the East-West Cold War focus to a regional orientation with greater flexibility for responding to future threats to United States national security. It is important to remember that the recommended adjustments reflected in the figure are relative changes within the mission areas and are not meant to imply a comparison between mission areas in terms of real dollars.




Figure 14. Adjustments to Mission Category Spending.

CONCLUSIONS.

This thesis has examined impact of the new world order on the national security strategy of the United States. It has identified regions where United States forces will likely be required in the future and the sorts of threats that our military is likely to face in the post-Cold War environment. Finally, recommendations for spending adjustments based on national strategy and anticipated future threats were developed.

APPENDIX A

DATA ON PREVIOUS COMMITMENT OF MILITARY FORCES

BACKGROUND.

The information contained in this section represents data collected from several sources. America's Small Wars [Collins, 1991], The War Atlas [Kidron and Smith, 1983], and Instances of the Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1989 [CRS Report for Congress, 1989] were the primary sources of data. It was necessary to make determinations about the categorization and characterization of the various conflicts that the United States has been involved in as these sources did not utilize the same terminology and definitions in presenting their information. The categorization and characterization utilized is based on the definitions presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis.

DATA.

The following tables have been used in the analysis of the various conflicts that the United States has been involved in since 1900:

Table 10. 1900 to Pre-World War I

Table 11. World War I to Pre-World War II

Table 12. World War II to Pre-Vietnam

Table 13. Vietnam War to 1980

Table 14. 1980 to Present

For each conflict, the year(s), type, intensity and region where the conflict occurred is listed. The legend for the abbreviations for type and region are presented below. The definition of intensity was presented in Chapter 1.

Region of Conflict

NA - North America	CA - Central America
SA - South America	CN - Caribbean
EU - Europe	AF - Africa
ME - Middle East	EA - East Asia
GL - Global	

Type of Conflict

IR - Insurgency, Resistance	Cd'E - Coups d'Etat
CI - Counter Insurgency	CT - Combatting Terrorism
SE - Security Operations	CO - Conventional Operations
NO - Noncombat Operations	

In categorizing the data, it is readily apparent that conflicts are not easily distilled into a single type (i.e., IR, Cd'E, CI, CT, SE, CO or NO). In fact, in most conflicts there elements of more than one type. For example, in the operation in Liberia to evacuate United States personnel, the Marine forces prepared for and conducted a forced entry type of assault. Thus, it was categorized as a conventional operation. However, the operation also had a noncombat aspect to it. The Marines conducted a Noncombat Evacuation Operation (NEO) of United States citizens.

In making the judgments about the categorization of the type of conflict, the type of force and manner of employment will be the primary factors to be considered. So in the case of Liberia discussed above, the force was conventional and the Marines conducted a conventional forced entry which would make the categorization of the conflict CO rather than NO.

Table 10. 1900 - Pre World War I

Country	Year	Type Conflict							Intensity			Region								
		IR	CdE	CI	SE	CT	Ø	NO	Low	Mid	High	NA	CA	SA	CN	EU	AF	ME	EA	GL
Philippines	1889 - 1913			1					1										1	
China	1900						1		1										1	
Columbia/Panama	1901				1				1				1							
Columbia	1902				1				1				1							
Columbia/Panama	1902				1				1				1							
Honduras	1903				1				1				1							
Dominican Republic	1903				1				1				1							
Syria	1903				1				1								1			
Abssinia	1903 - 1904				1				1							1				
Panama	1903 - 1914				1				1				1							
Dominican Republic	1904				1				1				1							
Tangier, Morocco	1904				1				1							1				
Korea	1904 - 1905				1				1										1	
Cuba	1906 - 1909						1		1							1				
Honduras	1907				1				1				1							
Nicaragua	1910				1				1				1							
Honduras	1911				1				1				1							
China	1911				1				1										1	
Honduras	1912				1				1				1							
Cuba	1912				1				1						1					
Turkey	1912				1				1							1				
Nicaragua	1912 - 1925				1				1				1							
China	1912 - 1941				1				1										1	
Mexico	1913				1				1				1							
Haiti	1914 - 1934				1				1							1				
Dominican Republic	1914						1		1							1				
Mexico	1914 - 1917						1		1				1							
Dominican Republic	1916 - 1924				1				1							1				
		0	0	1	23	0	4	0	28	0	0	2	10	0	7	2	1	1	5	0

Table 11. World War I - Pre World War II

Country	Year	Type Conflict										Intensity			Region							
		IR	C&E	CI	SE	CT	GO	NO	Low	Mid	High	NA	CA	SA	EU	AF	ME	EA	GL			
World War I	1917 - 1918						1				1											1
Cuba	1917 - 1922				1				1													
Mexico	1917 - 1918						1		1				1									
Panama	1918 - 1920				1				1					1								
Soviet Russia	1918 - 1920				1				1							1						
Dalmatia	1919				1				1							1						
Turkey	1919				1				1													
Honduras	1919				1				1					1								
Guatemala	1920				1				1					1								
Russia (Siberia)	1920 - 1922				1				1													
Panama-Costa Rica	1921				1				1					1								
Turkey	1922				1				1							1						
Honduras	1924				1				1					1								
Panama	1925				1				1					1								
Nicaragua	1926 - 1933				1				1					1								
Cuba	1933						1		1							1						
Newfoundland/Carribbean	1940				1				1													1
Greenland	1941				1				1													
Netherlands (Dutch Guiana)	1941				1				1													
Iceland	1941				1				1													
Germany	1941						1				1											
		0	0	0	0	17	0	4	0	19	1	1	1	7	0	3	8	0	0	0	0	2

Table 12. World War II - Pre Vietnam

Country	Year	Type Conflict							Intensity		Region									
		IR	CdE	CI	SE	CT	GD	ND	Low	Mid	High	NA	CA	SA	ON	EU	AF	ME	EA	GL
World War II	1941 - 1945						1				1									1
Philippines	1942 - 1945	1							1										1	
Burma	1942 - 1945	1							1										1	
France	1944	1							1						1					
China	1945						1			1									1	
Trieste	1946						1		1						1					
Palestine	1948 -							1	1								1			
Berlin Blockade	1948						1		1						1					
China	1948 - 1949			1					1										1	
Korean War	1950 - 1953						1			1									1	
Formosa (Taiwan)	1950 - 1955						1		1										1	
China	1954 - 1955							1	1										1	
Vietnam	1955 - 1965						1		1										1	
Egypt	1956							1	1									1		
Lebanon	1958					1			1									1		
The Caribbean	1959 - 1960					1			1						1					
Cuba	1960 - 1965		1						1						1					
Thailand	1962							1	1										1	
Laos	1962 - 1975			1					1										1	
Zaire	1960 - 1964						1		1								1			
		3	1	1	3	0	9	3	17	2	1	0	0	0	2	3	1	3	10	1

Table 13. Vietnam War - 1980

Country	Year	Type Conflict							Intensity			Region								
		IR	CdE	CI	SE	CT	⊖	NO	Low	Mid	High	NA	CA	SA	ON	EU	AF	ME	EA	GL
Vietnam War	1964 - 1973							1		1									1	
Dominican Republic	1965							1		1					1					
Zaire	1967							1		1							1			
Cambodia	1970							1		1									1	
Evacuation from Cyprus	1974							1		1						1				
Evacuation from Vietnam	1975							1		1									1	
Evacuation from Cambodia	1975							1		1									1	
Mayaguez Incident	1975							1		1									1	
Lebanon	1976							1		1								1		
Korea	1976							1		1									1	
Zaire	1978							1		1							1			
		0	0	0	0	0	11	0	9	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	6	0

Table 14. 1980 - Present

Country	Year	Type Conflict							Intensity			Region								
		IR	CdE	CI	SE	CT	QD	NO	Low	Mid	High	NA	CA	SA	ON	EU	AF	ME	EA	GL
Iran (Desert One)	1980					1			1									1		
El Salvador	1981				1				1											
Libya	1981						1			1							1			
Nicaragua	1981 - 1990	1							1					1						
Sinai	1982							1	1									1		
Lebanon	1982							1	1									1		
Egypt	1983						1		1									1		
Honduras	1983 - 1989						1		1					1						
Chad	1983						1		1								1			
Grenada	1983						1		1						1					
Persian Gulf	1984						1		1									1		
Falkland Islands	1984							1	1					1						
Italy	1985						1		1							1				
Libya	1986						1			1							1			
Bolivia	1986							1	1					1						
Narco Conflict	1986 -						1		1											1
Persian Gulf	1987 - 1988				1					1								1		
Panama	1988				1				1					1						
Libya	1989						1		1								1			
Panama	1989 - 1990						1			1				1						
Andean Initiative (Drugs)	1989							1	1					1						
Philippines	1989						1		1									1		
Liberia	1990						1		1								1			
Somalia	1990						1		1								1			
Southwest Asia (Iraq)	1990 - 1991						1				1							1		
Turkey	1991 -								1									1		
		1	0	1	2	1	1	15	6	2	4	1	0	5	3	1	1	6	8	1

APPENDIX B

OTHER THREAT REVIEWS AND COMMENTS ON FORCE REQUIREMENTS

BACKGROUND.

In Chapter 2, a literature review of the anticipated threats to the nation and force requirements for the period under discussion was presented. Most of the detailed findings came from high level policymakers and generals charged with preparing the military to protect and defend the Constitution. Only a small section was dedicated to defense analysts, academics, contractors and government officials who have been instrumental in developing the policies that are articulated by the nation's military leadership. The intent of this appendix is to provide a more detailed account of several of the more noteworthy analyses in this area.

It is worth noting that while there is a great deal of information that has been published recently on this topic, many of the publications reflect the strong biases of the authors. Where this is the case, a comment to this effect was included.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE.

Motley [1991] has written a book entitled Beyond the Soviet Threat in which he discusses the the future threats to United States

national security and the forces that will be necessary to combat these threats. He has condensed much of this information into a diagram which summarizes his key points (See Figure 15).

Motley draws some interesting conclusions concerning the future threat environment. The book was published post Desert Storm but prior to most of the recent disintegration of the Soviet Union. Given the dating of the book, it is not surprising that he prominently discusses Soviet economic growth and US-USSR cooperation. What is surprising, however, is the degree to which Motley believes that the 21st Century will be dominated by contingencies in which the Army can get by with light forces. His background in the Army does give a clue as to why he believes light forces will be of most use in the next century. As an United States Army officer, Motley was involved primarily with *light units* including tours with Airborne, Ranger and Infantry. Overall, Motley presents a detailed analysis of his expectations for requirements for future forces based on projected threats.




Figure 15. Motley's Analysis - The 1990s: A Traditional Era

Deitchman [1991] also discusses changes in the strategic landscape. He presents several important trends including the following:

- Changes in the Economic Balance: The Rise of Europe and Japan. The European Economic Community and the economic growth

in Japan coupled with their growing security independence from the United States could significantly impact on our national security. As an example, Deitchman cites the potential for Japan to favorably respond to the United States' encouragement to accept more responsibility for their own defense which means increasing their military strength. If this growth were to continue unchecked, Japan could become a military force to be reckoned with in the Pacific Rim. In keeping with this theme, Deitchman foresees a declining self-sufficiency and reduced flexibility for the American economy based on trade deficits and growing economic interdependence of nations.

- **Changes in the Military Balance: Bipolar to Multipolar.** The discussion focuses on the elimination of the Soviet Union as a superpower as a result of recent events and the power vacuum that has been created. Deitchman discusses the potential for rapidly shifting alliances that create instability and uncertainty in the world. Also, the industrialization and militarization of third world nations has some serious implications for the future. In addition, the reunification of Germany and the eventual direction this union takes has significant security implications. East Asia, with specific emphasis on Japan, India and China, are moving toward achieving world power status and will clearly impact on future security arrangements.

- **Turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.** The discussion of this trend centers around the uncertain endstate in this area of critical importance to the United States. For the past 40 years, the United States and NATO have demonstrated their resolve to thwart the spread of the Communist ideal. However, Deitchman

believes that "the Soviet Empire did not 'crumble,' as many Western observers suggested, but rather that the USSR decided to let that empire fend for itself in some significant degree while it put its internal house in order."¹ This is a particularly disturbing thought that requires some degree of consideration.

- The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. This phenomenon "is likely to create turmoil in the world for decades to come."² This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Islamic population is rising at a rate significantly greater than the rest of the world. In addition, this part of the world contains a disproportionate share of the world's precious energy resources. A fundamental problem that the United States encounters in dealing with Islamic fundamentalists is that they do not tend to be deterred by military threats. On the contrary, military threats often have the opposite effect on the regions - that is, military threats tend to increase the chance of a violent outcome.

- Weakening of Forward Defense. The perception of a reduced Soviet threat has had the effect of causing several nations where the United States has historically had basing rights to reconsider and in some cases withdraw these rights.

The trends that Deitchman discusses translate into major strategy objectives. Specifically, he lists the following objectives. Note the objectives which have been highlighted - these objectives correspond to requirements for future military forces.

1. Continuing nuclear deterrence of attack on our country and our major allies;
2. Rejuvenating our economic and political strength;
3. Reshaping the rules and mechanisms that govern bilateral and multilateral trade and investment, to insure continued orderly and non-predatory functioning and growth of the world economy;
4. Reducing the sources of economic and political antagonism in the developing world that are targeted against the U.S. and its allies, and at the same time helping the developing world grow economically in ways that will not threaten our security, the world's environment, or the continued viability of democratic government in the world;
5. Redesigning our conventional military forces to meet the new worldwide challenges that endanger us, and;
6. Undertaking, with our allies, the decisions and the steps necessary to defeat international terrorism, including drug terrorism, directed toward the United States and our allies.³

Concerning objectives 5 and 6, Deitchman talks about requirements for military forces in the future which are to be used in support of social purposes and less responsive to the primary military needs.⁴ He goes on to say that we cannot afford to build an armed forces that is big enough to fight a "come-as-you-are war" in response to a massive surprise attack with limited warning. In short, Deitchman proposes a return to the isolationist posture for the United States and states that our nuclear deterrent should be adequate to achieve our national security objectives.

Deitchman has articulated in a clear manner, and in considerable detail, several azimuths for the world security framework over the next 20 years. His projected trends are in

keeping with the work of other analysts; however, he has also elaborated on several trends that have been glossed over by others. However, his translations of those trends into requirements for future forces seems to be a step back and unrealistic in view of recent experiences in the Persian Gulf. For example, Saddam Hussein was not deterred from aggression against Kuwait or forced to retreat although the United States (with our nuclear weapons arsenal) demanded that he do so. The threat of nuclear escalation either was not credible to Saddam or he was not impressed with the potential of the arsenal. In either case, nuclear weapons did not help us achieve our objectives in this dispute.

Sarkesian and Williams [1990] have published a book entitled The U.S. Army in a New Security Era in which they review their view of the future threats and requirements for the services to combat these threats. As the title suggests, the book has an Army flavor, but it does a good job of dealing with the subject. It does, however, suffer from the pre-Desert Shield and Desert Storm publishing date so it lacks the benefit of lessons learned in this conflict and fails to fully account for many of the drastic changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union. The main rationale for citing this book is to establish another source which confirms many of the claims of third world emergence and to highlight the absolute necessity of utilizing sources that are current (i.e., published within the last 12 months or in 1991). Sources published after this date tend to overstate the reduction of the threat to United States security interests and overemphasize Soviet resurgence.

Several points made by Sarkesian and Williams that are of interest are listed below:

1. Conventional conflicts beyond Europe have not been a principal threat to the security of the United States, despite our involvement in several cases over the past forty years; such conflicts will be even less important to the interests of the United States in the future.
2. Those conflicts that may arise between, and most often within, Third World states will very likely not put our interests at such risk as to warrant conventional force intervention. In cases where our interests are threatened, the instruments of policy will be more likely be those of military assistance and possibly special forces.
3. The Soviet Union is not and will not become capable of significant application of conventional force in the Third World beyond the Eurasian continent. The USSR is a continental power capable of exerting force against any and all states on its continental periphery; that is and should be our principal concern, but not because of Soviet capabilities per se, but because of the nature of U.S. principal security interests.
4. The primary conventional conflict mission for the U.S. Army thus should be directed to the defense of NATO, Japan, and South Korea. Special considerations also dictate modest conventional force capabilities for potential conflict in the Persian Gulf/Middle East.⁵

Cannistraro [1991] and Williams [1991] (Note that this is another Williams than was discussed above.) have also presented similar predictions concerning future threats. While the ideas are not new, they do present additional credible information on the topic. Their focus tends to be on the aspects on weapons proliferation (particularly that of nuclear weapons) and regional conflicts tied to fundamentalist and nationalist movements. They concluded

independently that these movements are particularly destabilizing and have the most potential to result in aggression.

Tonelson [1991] presents another interesting perspective on threats to national interests and our nation's role in world in the future. He discusses the threats to national security interests in terms of a rethinking of our national strategy. His arguments center around the proliferation of new and more dangerous weapons coupled with the inability of the country to finance Cold War and Desert Storm type adventurism. This he believes makes investments in foreign nations less beneficial to the United States in the future. Tonelson also believes that the attention the United States has displayed throughout the world has done little in the long term to provide for the security of the country or the accomplishment of national goals and objectives.

He argues that post World War II, the country has had a foreign policy which is best described by the terms "internationalism" or "globalism." This approach to United States foreign policy seemed necessary to unite the non-Communist world against the spread of Communism. This intense focus caused our national interests to be defined as any nation which was non-Communist, and as one might expect, this encompassed a large portion of the world. This type of intervention placed a significant drain on the resources of the United States. Tonelson further argues that the costs of intervention on this scale far outweighed the benefits in many instances; he cites Vietnam as an example. In addition, Tonelson argues that another unfortunate symptom of this foreign policy focus is the neglect of domestic issues.

Concerning Tonelson's article, Atlantic Monthly's editor writes the following synopsis,

For almost half a century U.S. foreign policy has been based on internationalism - on the assumption that the security and prosperity of every place on earth is vital to America's own. Internationalism, has entailed enormous risks and costs - more than we can continue to bear or need to pay - offers scant promise of success. It is time for a new foreign-policy blueprint - a stripped-down strategy whereby the United States looks out for itself and recognizes that building its own strength, not creating a perfect world world, is the best guarantor of its safety and well being.⁶

To further elaborate on his concept, Tonelson explains that if the United States were to play less of a moderator role in world affairs, other nations would be forced to develop these qualities and abilities. Furthermore, he proposes a deemphasis of alliances and multilateral institutions which create entangling relationships that limit United States freedom of action and self-reliance.

Tonelson identifies only two threats to United States interests in the third world: 1) Insuring that no significant military or intelligence threats are present in the Caribbean Basin, and 2) Insuring that Mexico remains a viable economic and social state. Another threat that Tonelson discusses is the threat of weapons proliferation. On this point, he states that protecting the nation through a limited Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program would be the best alternative.

While Tonelson presents an interesting concept for an alternative national strategy, his arguments are incomplete and have serious flaws. First, he assumes that the United States can back out

of our established role in international affairs. Nations that have come to depend on the United States for support (economic, military, and political) would likely be reticent to relinquish the United States from these "obligations." In addition, even if the United States tried to play less of a world role, it is unlikely that the country could maintain this stance. Other international actors such as terrorist groups are not likely to leave the country out of their battles. The prosperity of our nation will always be a target for groups that perceive that they have not received their "fair share." Secondly, Tonelson assumes that the world is comprised of rational actors and states. Saddam Hussein's Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is an example of an irrational actor attacking and holding a neighbor state even after the world (in the form of the United Nations resolutions) lined up against the aggression. Initial analysis may have led one to conclude that the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was simply a regional conflict not requiring the intervention of the United States or the United Nations. However, allowing the aggression to stand had potentially devastating ramifications on the balance of power in the Middle East and the supply of oil worldwide. Furthermore, it is worth noting that alliances were crucial to the resolution of this crisis. Without the United States playing a leadership role in dealing with its allies, it is doubtful that the conflict could have been resolved on terms favorable to the United States. Thirdly, Tonelson's approach to national security would essentially be a return to "fortress America" similar to the pre-World War II era. The nation would be reacting to threats rather than shaping the world and helping to avert future global conflicts.

CONCLUSIONS.

This appendix has provided additional information on predicted future threats to national security. The information contained in this section was derived from defense analysts, academics, contractors and government officials who have been instrumental in developing the programs and policies that have been articulated by the nation's political and military leadership.

It is worth noting that there are many authors that have written on this subject in the past year which provide worthwhile insights. However, to enumerate on all of these individuals writings would do little to enhance understanding of this subject. Most tend to center around a handful of central themes which have been captured in the Chapter 2 or this appendix. As a result only the most enlightening of the works have been discussed in this thesis. Additional sources can be located in the Bibliography.

ENDNOTES

1 S. J. Deitchman. Beyond the Thaw: A New National Strategy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1991, p.53.

2 Ibid, p.55.

3 Ibid, p.95.

4 Ibid, p.99.

5 Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams. The U.S. Army in a New Security Era. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1990, pp.178-9.

6 Alan Tonelson. "What is the National Interest?" In Atlantic Monthly, July 1991, p. 35.

ACRONYMS

AF	Africa
CA	Central America
Cd'E	Coups d'Etat
CI	Counter Insurgency
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CN	Caribbean
CO	Conventional Operations
CT	Combatting Terrorism
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
EA	East Asia
EU	Europe
GL	Global
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IGB	Inter-German Border
IR	Insurgency, Resistance
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
ME	Middle East
NA	North America
NDU	National Defense University
NG/R	National Guard/Reserves
NM	Nautical Miles
NO	Noncombat Operations
POMCUS	Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Units Sets
R&D	Research and Development
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SA	South America
SE	Security Operations
SWA	Southwest Asia
TBM	Tactical Ballistic Missiles
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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